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I.

INTRODUCTION

This decade has exposed numerous corporate scandals that have
shaken shareholders, directors, and the markets. The wave of scandals
that began in 2001 at corporations such as Enron and WorldCom
revealed directors and officers out of control.1 Thereafter, a more
insidious scandal struck, involving directors and officers backdating their
stock options in their own self-interest at corporations such as Apple,
McAfee, Monster, and Bed Bath & Beyond.2 Congress, the SEC, and the
listing companies responded to these scandals by imposing new, more
restrictive requirements on corporations and their directors and officers.3
Shareholders also responded with attempts to take more control of the
corporations in which they hold stock on issues such as environmental
∗
Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. This Article has benefited from
comments by participants at Washington University s Regional Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress
workshop, by participants at a faculty colloquium of the University of Oklahoma College of Law,
and by my colleagues in a summer workshop at Saint Louis University. I thank Patrick Pedano and
Stephanie Gwillim for their excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441 42 (2003) (noting the Enron and
WorldCom scandals revealed that (1) officers ran amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and
other abuses; and (2) directors allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the
market while they contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices ).
2. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top Officials
Take a Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (discussing the backdating scandals occurring at,
among others, Apple Computer Inc., McAfee Inc., Monster Worldwide Inc., and Bed Bath &
Beyond Inc.).
3. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004); id. § 301,
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (forcing listing companies to impose more restrictive requirements on public
companies); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2004) (stating new, more restrictive
definition of director independence); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules, R. 4200(a)(15) (2004)
(similar). As argued elsewhere, the Delaware courts also responded to the recent scandals by
allowing more cases to survive pretrial motions asserting the business judgment defense, but they
have not altered the current formulation of the business judgment rule. Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion
and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts Response to
Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 589, 603 04 (2008).
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standards and labor rights, as well as on matters that may entrench
directors in their positions or lead directors to promote their own
interests at the expense of shareholders.4 Yet, litigation remains a device
commonly employed by shareholders when boards of directors abuse
their power. Recent shareholder derivative actions against Apple,
Citigroup, Tyson Foods, Walt Disney, and Enron, among others,
demonstrate that judicial recourse remains a powerful tool used by
shareholders.5
Shareholder derivative litigation, however, rarely succeeds in
holding directors liable for their decisions. One reason is the business
judgment rule defense, which protects boards of directors from legal
liability in most such cases.6 Under courts current formulation, the
business judgment rule operates as a presumption that the defendantdirectors have acted consistent with their fiduciary duties.7 If the
plaintiff-shareholders cannot rebut this presumption, then the defendantdirectors cannot be held liable.8 In the unlikely event that the plaintiffshareholders rebut the presumption, then the defendant-directors must
prove that the challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.9
Yet, despite evidence that shareholders rarely rebut the business
judgment rule presumption and even in the aftermath of the recent
scandals, some corporate scholars assert that courts are not providing
sufficient protection to directors decisions under current law.10 Other
scholars, however, claim that courts should exercise broader review of
directors decisions.11 The true debate concerns the proper balancing
point between directors authority to make decisions for the corporation
and shareholders right to hold directors accountable for their decisions.12
4. See infra Part III.C.2.
5. Disputes between shareholders and directors and officers may be resolved through quasijudicial means such as arbitration, but judicial recourse remains the norm today.
6. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) ( The business
judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory
authority to manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors. (quoting MM Cos. v.
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003))); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) (stating the business judgment rule protect[s] and promote[s] the full and free exercise
of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors ), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN.
Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986), as recognized in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
7. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); see also
infra Part III.A.
8. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
9. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 109 (2004) ( Establishing the proper mix of deference and accountability thus emerges
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A balancing point that prohibits director liability in all but the most
egregious cases would fulfill the purposes that originally led to the
creation of the business judgment rule, such as protecting directors from
Monday morning quarterbacking by shareholders, from honest mistakes
of judgment, and from unpopular decisions.13 But finding a balancing
point that respects directors authority, without completely eliminating
the possibility of holding directors accountable for decisions not made in
the best interests of the corporation, proves difficult in theory and in
application.
Even if corporate scholars could agree on the proper balancing point
between authority and accountability, a complex problem of procedure
needs to be resolved. In a shareholder derivative action, the plaintiffshareholders seek to hold the defendant-directors accountable for their
decisions and the defendant-directors inevitably assert that their
decisions are protected by the business judgment rule. Thus, the
business judgment rule operates as the mechanism that balances the
directors legal authority to manage the corporation against the
shareholders right to hold those directors accountable for the decisions
they make on behalf of the corporation.14 Because the business judgment
rule is the mechanism by which courts balance authority and
accountability, courts need a framework for applying the business
judgment rule that achieves the desired balancing point.
The authority versus accountability dilemma is not unique to
corporations; it is prevalent throughout the law. For instance, much
scholarship has been devoted to that dilemma in the areas of international
law and administrative law.15 However, corporate scholars have not
explored the insights this scholarship may offer for corporate law. This
Article will do so. Part II discusses the authority versus accountability
dilemma by drawing upon the literature discussing that dilemma in other
areas of law. Section A examines the informal methods of accountability
that have been identified through this literature, and analyzes how these
methods may apply in the corporate context. Section B then examines
the formal methods of accountability and explores specific examples for
the insights they may offer for corporate law.

as the central problem in applying the business judgment rule to particular situations. ).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87 (arguing that the business judgment rule is the
principal mechanism by which corporate law resolves that tension ); id. at 84 (describing the
business judgment rule as being designed to effect a compromise on a case-by-case basis
between two competing values: authority and accountability ).
15. See infra Part II.
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Part III analyzes the authority versus accountability dilemma
presented in the corporate context. In Section A, the Article focuses on
legal accountability and describes the balancing of authority and
accountability that occurs in shareholder derivative litigation through the
current formulation of the business judgment rule. Section B then
examines and rejects corporate scholars proposals seeking to shift the
balance more toward accountability in shareholder derivative litigation,
including a proposal to abolish the business judgment rule and proposals
to permit broader judicial review of directors decisions. Section C then
analyzes a recent proposal seeking to shift the balance more toward
authority, by having courts adopt an abstention doctrine approach to the
business judgment rule. It demonstrates that the proposed abstention
approach does not offer an effective replacement for the current
formulation of the business judgment rule and that courts are unlikely to
adopt it.
Having rejected corporate scholars proposals for shifting the
balance between authority and accountability in Part III, Part IV
advocates for a new approach to the business judgment rule that offers a
more effective framework for courts performing such balancing in
shareholder derivative litigation. Section A examines the benefits of a
procedural mechanism versus a substantive mechanism for balancing
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation. After
recognizing the advantages of a procedural mechanism, Section B
explains the benefits of applying the procedures surrounding the
qualified immunity doctrine to the business judgment rule defense.
II. THE AUTHORITY VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY DILEMMA
The authority versus accountability dilemma can be seen in all facets
of life as well as in the law. Parents may give their teenager the authority
to use one of the family s cell phones, but will hold the teenager
accountable if he exceeds the phone s pre-paid minutes. A law firm may
give their associates the authority to use the internet in performing their
job functions, but will hold them accountable if they visit websites
unrelated to their work such as pornography websites or their MySpace
pages.16 A presidential election offers a more complex example of the
authority versus accountability debate. When voters elect an individual
16. Perhaps to some degree these examples reflect a sentiment to trust but verify. See
generally Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989), available
at http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/farewell.asp (describing how the United States
should act toward the former Soviet Union).
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to the Presidency (albeit indirectly through the Electoral College), they
are concerned whether that President will act in their best interests: the
President possesses substantial authority, but cannot effectively be held
accountable for specific actions17 except through voters power not to reelect that President to a second term or perhaps through impeachment.18
Whenever one person (the principal) entrusts another (the agent)
with authority to act, a classic agency problem is presented.19 The
principal delegates certain authority to the agent to act on the principal s
behalf. The principal, however, also wants the ability to hold the agent
accountable if the agent fails to complete the assigned tasks or exceeds
the authority given by the principal. For a principal to hold an agent
accountable, the principal first must know what the agent has done and
also must have the ability to impose adverse consequences on the agent.
Thus, measures to assure accountability require mechanisms for
transmission of information as well as enforcement. 20 The classic
17. In some respects, the Framers of the Constitution perhaps did not intend for the President to
be subject to any accountability. For instance, the Framers allocated to the President the sole power
to wage war and the sole authority to grant pardons.
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of
war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and
employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the
executive authority. . . . He is also to be authorized to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT. . . . As
the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be
inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives
which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to
considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The
reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally
inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or
connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind. On the other
hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often
encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the
apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency. On these
accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government,
than a body of men.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
18. The President has presidential immunity for his or her official acts. See Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681, 696 (1997) ( With respect to acts taken in his public character that is, official
acts the President may be disciplined principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits for
damages. ).
19. See generally WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, § 1, at 2 4
(3d ed. 2001).
20. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability and Global
Governance 3 4 (Harv. Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov t, Politics Research Group, Working
Paper No. 01-4, 2001) ( Accountable actions are explainable and sanctionable. Principals can
require agents to give reasons so that they can make judgments about their actions. Thus some
degree of transparency is essential for accountability. Principals can also directly or indirectly
sanction their agents if displeased with their actions. ).
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agency problem becomes more complex in the corporate context, but the
tension between authority and accountability remains.21
A. Accountability Through Informal, Non-Legal Methods
Shareholder derivative litigation is not the only possible check on
directors actions, as informal accountability mechanisms do exist. A
broad and diverse literature has developed on the topic of accountability,
which identifies at least four informal processes through which
accountability can occur: (1) electoral accountability, (2) hierarchical
accountability, (3) reputational accountability, and (4) market
accountability.22 Many of these informal accountability mechanisms
apply in the corporate context and may act as restraints on directors
authority at least to some degree.
Perhaps the most common example of an informal accountability
mechanism is electoral accountability, which can be seen in the
democratic elections that occur every year in the United States.23
Electoral accountability is also exercised at corporations annual
meetings of shareholders, when shareholders vote in person or by proxy
for the next year s board of directors.24 Shareholders elect the directors
of the corporation25 and the law vests those directors with almost
unlimited authority to manage the corporation.26 Because shareholders
21. Some corporate scholars disagree that an agency relationship exists between directors and
shareholders, but even under the director primacy theory directors are supposed to act in the best
interests of shareholders and thus the authority versus accountability dilemma still exists. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy].
22. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 4 5; see also GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 74 76 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2004) (explaining the
various accountability mechanisms such as peer accountability, public reputational accountability,
market accountability, financial accountability, and legal accountability that are important within
networks while noting that electoral accountability and hierarchical accountability are not applicable
in networks); Erik B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International
Governance, 31 BROOK. J. INT L L. 139, 149 54 (2005) (describing accountability mechanisms as
including fiscal, market, supervisory, legal, peer, market, reputational, and hierarchical); Orna
Rabinovich-Einy, Technology s Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for Accountability in
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 261 (2006) (stating that accountability can be created
through informal mechanisms such as by relying on professionalism or market forces to curb
decision-maker discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and related
outcomes ).
23. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 4 5.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2007).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b) 212(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§
7.28, 8.03(c) (2007).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (stating [t]he business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors ); MODEL
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elect the directors, an observer might think that shareholders possess the
ability to hold directors accountable for the decisions they make on
behalf of the corporation. In theory, if a corporation s shareholders
believe that the current directors are not acting in the best interests of the
corporation, they may hold those directors accountable for their decisions
by voting them out of office through the election of new directors to the
board.27 In reality, shareholders have limited ability to hold directors
accountable for their decisions. Shareholders possess no power to
initiate corporate action 28 and possess the right to vote on only a few
matters such as election of directors, mergers, sales, dissolution, and
amendments to the corporate charter and bylaws.29 Even director
elections are essentially determined by the existing board, because the
existing board typically nominates the slate of directors on which
shareholders then vote.30 When a group of shareholders wants to
nominate their own slate of directors, they typically must mount a costly
and difficult proxy contest.31 Thus, shareholders often resort to filing a
lawsuit on behalf of the corporation, which is called a shareholder
derivative lawsuit, when they believe that the directors have not acted in
the best interests of the corporation or that the directors have abused their
power.32
Any classic agency relationship, such as the employer-employee
relationship, represents hierarchical accountability.33 For instance, when
the board of directors hires a CEO to run the daily affairs of the

BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) ( All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority
of . . . and the business and affairs of the corporation . . . managed by or under the direction [of] . . .
its board of directors . . . . ).
27. Cf. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 3 ( Accountability can be created through actions in
the shadow of elections. ).
28. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 105.
29. Id. at 105 n.133 (listing shareholder rights as election of directors and approval of charter
or by-law amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation s assets, and voluntary
dissolution ). Bainbridge also notes that only electing directors and amending the by-laws do not
require board approval before shareholder action is possible. Id. at 105 06 n.133 (citing DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211); see also Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 21, at 569 72
(discussing the weak control rights of shareholders).
30. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 105 06 n.133.
31. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, § 9.5.4, 394 96 (1986). However, the advent
of electronic proxy voting may make such proxy contexts cheaper and easier. Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807 n.47 (2007) (stating that
electronic proxy voting may make it much cheaper and easier for dissenting shareholders to mount
a proxy battle ).
32. See CLARK, supra note 31, at 396 ( The derivative suit, or action brought on behalf of the
corporation by a shareholder, solves collective action problems in an ingenious way. ).
33. Cf. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12 ( In the international organizational model, the
principal form of accountability is hierarchical: of agents to principals. ).
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corporation, the CEO is accountable to the board of directors.34 Thus,
the board can fire the CEO at any time if the CEO does not act consistent
with the board s instructions or, more generally, does not act in the best
interests of the corporation.35 This hierarchical relationship is duplicated
through every employee hired within the corporation.36 The shareholders
and the directors, however, do not have a typical hierarchical
relationship. In theory, shareholders can remove directors from office at
any time with or without cause, but such power often is restricted and
shareholders can rarely coordinate such action.37
Reputational accountability refers to the embarrassment and damage
that people may suffer if their poor choices or bad acts become known.38
Thus, as applied to corporations, directors will theoretically act in the
best interests of the corporation for fear of damaging their professional
and personal reputations.39 Obviously, a key to such accountability is
awareness of the directors actions by the people to whom the directors
feel connected either professionally or personally. If directors actions
are not transparent and are not publicly known, they need not fear
reputational accountability. Thus, publicity and transparency are vital to
proper functioning of reputational accountability.40
A similar restraint on directors may occur through market
accountability, such as when corporations are held responsible by
consumers.41 In other words, market forces [may] curb decision-maker
discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and
related outcomes. 42 This form of accountability can be seen in
corporations voluntary disclosures of adverse information in advance of

34. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 5.8, 231 40 (2002);
CLARK, supra note 31, § 3.3.1, at 114.
35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 231 (stating all corporate powers are exercised by or
under the board s authority which includes the power to hire and fire ).
36. Cf. id. ( In turn, corporate officers may delegate some of their responsibilities to less senior
employees, and so forth down the organizational chart. ).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (2007).
38. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 5 ( Reputational accountability occurs through
publicity. ); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261 (stating that accountability can be created
through informal mechanisms such as by relying on professionalism or market forces to curb
decision-maker discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and related
outcomes ).
39. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 17 ( Reputational accountability is crucial: without
credibility, organizations and groups cannot become accepted as participants in the ongoing
bargaining processes that produce outcomes. ).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261; see also Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 3
( Accountability can also be accomplished through markets, and as [a] result of publicity. ).
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such information being made public through other means, as well as
corporations general concern about stock price. Directors, both
individually and as a board, can also exercise internal accountability
through self-evaluation and internal review.43
These informal methods of accountability can be seen in other areas
of law that also face the authority versus accountability dilemma. The
following sections briefly describe the authority versus accountability
dilemmas presented in international law and administrative law, and
demonstrate the functioning of the informal methods of accountability
within these contexts. Although the authority versus accountability
dilemmas in international law and administrative law may be more
complicated than the modern corporation, they reveal the limitations and
ineffectiveness of informal methods of accountability.
1. International Law
In modern times, nations have consented to the formation of
international organizations to facilitate nations relationships on such
matters as international trade, international environmental standards, and
international crimes. The nature and extent of these international
organizations authority varies as does the accountability of such
organizations, but these various international organizations typically
possess the authority to promulgate substantive rules that will affect
private transactions and that often will supplant national law with
international rules and standards.44 Their authority arises from the treaty
commitments of their member nations.45 However, these international
organizations authority to act is not absolute, as the international rules
and standards they promulgate often require enforcement as well as
implementation by member nations courts, administrative agencies, and
legislative bodies.46
43. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261.
44. Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1556 57 (1999); Sidney A. Shapiro,
International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 435, 436 (2002) ( The public has an important stake in the adoption of international
standards. ).
45. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1556 57.
46. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 44, at 436 (stating the government can make important
decisions concerning the enforcement of international standards in the United States without
effective public participation ); Stephan, supra note 44, at 1557 (citing NAFTA as one such
example); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT L L. & BUS. 681, 688 (1996) [hereinafter Stephan, Accountability] ( Aside
from the indirect discipline that voters impose on legislators and executives who participate in
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Despite the somewhat limited authority possessed by some
international organizations, many scholars argue that international
lawmaking suffers from an accountability deficit. 47 Rules that may
have a real impact on the affairs of workers, consumers, entrepreneurs,
and other people can come into force without those persons having either
an adequate opportunity to influence their content . . . or to elect out of
their application . . . . 48 In other words, these international organizations
may grant rights to and impose obligations on private individuals but
give those individuals a diminished role in the development and
implementation of these rights and duties. 49
Accountability does exist in international law, but to a limited
degree.50 For instance, international lawmakers face even weaker
electoral accountability than domestic lawmakers.51 Although the
member nations generally appoint their own bureaucratic representatives
to serve on these international lawmaking bodies, these individuals are
accountable only indirectly to the voters of their member nations.52
However, some executives of international organizations stand for direct
elections by member nations.53 Hierarchical accountability also is
minimal in this context. Although member nations typically must agree
in advance to the international commitments that [in turn] bind private
actors, 54 they often have little say in the rules and regulations
international lawmaking, the principal mechanism for limiting the effect of international public
legislation is the opportunity member states have to choose how to implement what the international
body enacted. ).
47. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1562; Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 735.
48. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1562; see also Shapiro, supra note 44, at 449 50 (explaining that
the public has limited ability to participate in the creation of international standards).
49. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1563; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1986) (declaring that international law includes rules governing
nations relations with persons, whether natural or juridical ).
50. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 4 (describing international law as hierarchical
accountability, which can be seen in member nations power to remove the head of an international
organization, rules restricting the discretion of such organizations, and member nations withholding
their budgetary contributions).
51. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; see also Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at
12 ( [I]n contrast to the realist world of untrammeled state power, the international organizational
model builds-in a set of restraints however weak they may be on the exercise of power. );
Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 ( The processes that generate the new international law are several
steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their decisions. ).
52. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 2 3; Michael A. Livermore, Note, Authority and
Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex
Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 778 (2006).
53. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12; Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; see
also Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 ( The processes that generate the new international law are
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their
decisions. ).
54. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1579; see also Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 687
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promulgated by these international organizations. The exercise of the
authority delegated to international lawmakers is not always subject to
subsequent legislative ratification by member nations.55 [M]ost national
legislatures have only two means of disciplining international
lawmakers, because substituting a different rule is not an option. They
can reject the rule generated through the international process, or they
can withhold funds from the lawmaking body. 56 Much scholarship has
argued that the absence of direct accountability threatens the legitimacy
of the rules promulgated by these international organizations.57
Although international organizations may not be effectively held
accountable through electoral accountability or hierarchical
accountability,58 they can potentially be held accountable through the
informal accountability methods of market accountability and
reputational accountability.59 They also can be held accountable through
rules governing how the organizations can operate, which may be
monitored by independent organizations and courts.60
Similarly,
monitoring activities by nations and their representatives potentially
provide accountability of the international organizations to the member
nations.61 Indeed, one of the common suggestions for improving the
accountability of international organizations is to reform the process to
achieve greater transparency and thus greater public participation.62
( More often, legislatures rely on the terms by which they initially accede to an international
organization to limit what their executives, acting through those organizations, can accomplish. And
when international organizations later supersede such restrictions, the legislature may be left with a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition. At a minimum, it will not be able to modify what the organization
produces without forcing an additional round of negotiations. And if it refuses to accept the
internationally agreed product and cannot force other countries to make changes, the legislature
either will have to accede to an action that disregards its previous instructions or force the executive
to resign from the organization. ).
55. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12; see
also Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 ( The processes that generate the new international law are
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their
decisions. ).
56. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682 83.
57. Livermore, supra note 52, at 778 79; Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 2 3; see also
Simon Burall & Caroline Neligan, The Accountability of International Organizations, GLOBAL
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 2, at 9 (2005) (noting that the
accountability mechanisms in place to ensure formal accountability do not work in the context of
IGOs and that increasing the accountability of IGOs will require more robust internal accountability
processes and a greater openness to external stakeholders ); Ngaire Woods, Good Governance in
International Organizations, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39, 44 (1999) (noting that accountability is
lacking in many international organizations).
58. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 1 2.
59. Id. at 3, 17.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
62. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 457 58 (stating that recommendation[s] focus[] on
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However, without enforcement mechanisms, transparency alone does not
solve the accountability equation.
Admittedly, the authority possessed by these international
organizations varies greatly, as do the mechanisms by which they may
potentially be held accountable by member nations, but informal
methods of accountability reign in this context. And despite the
extensive scholarship devoted to the authority versus accountability
debate in the context of international law, international law does not
seem to have achieved a satisfactory balancing of authority and
accountability across these international organizations. Indeed, the
balance in international law appears strongly tilted toward authority as
shown by the voluminous scholarship calling for more accountability
over international organizations.
2. Administrative Law
The United States has numerous administrative agencies that impact
the public as well as private individuals in areas such as health,
education, and housing. Congress gives these agencies the power to
exercise authority by statute, without any specific constraints on their
administrative discretion.63 Thus, these agencies power to affect
regulation in their given area is largely unchecked.64
Hierarchical accountability is weak in the context of administrative
law. Although the President possesses the power to appoint and remove
the heads of the various agencies, such power only permits the President
to indirectly affect the actions of such agencies.65 Because the executive
branch possesses such power, the public arguably holds some degree of
electoral accountability, but this is an even weaker means of indirect

transparency as a key procedural instrument to invoke more effective public participation );
Stephan, supra note 44, at 1580.
63. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 496 (2003).
64. Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring America s Government to Create Sustainable Development, 30
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL Y REV. 371, 386 (2006). Rudd proposes fixing this nonaccountability by having Congress limit administrative agency discretion and enact specific
legislation providing penalties when agency heads fail to properly use their discretion, and also by
reinstating judicial review of agency actions. Id. at 464 69.
65. Bressman, supra note 63, at 466, 486 91; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 504 (1989) ( Control
over the power to appoint key government officials was an issue of intense concern for the Framers.
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, providing for presidential appointment of major officers with
Senate consent, represented a deeply considered and much debated attempt to balance executive and
legislative involvement in the selection process. ).
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accountability.66 Similarly, such power arguably provides some degree
of transparency, which may deter improper motives and may indirectly
allow the public to assign blame for any improper exercise of agency
power.67 Yet, many commentators opine that the public lacks sufficient
means to hold an agency accountable when that agency abuses its
authority. Typically, in the context of governments, [w]hen the state
makes demands of its subjects, accountability means that the subjects
have some means of affecting those demands, either by choosing in some
fashion who may exercise the power to make those demands (voice) or
by taking steps to place themselves outside their scope (exit). 68 Neither
option exists in the public s relationship with administrative agencies.
Just as with international law, the balance appears weighted strongly
toward authority.
Arguably these administrative agencies present a close analogy to
corporations. Voters elect the President (albeit indirectly through the
Electoral College), and the President then appoints agency heads to act
consistent with the President s view of wise policy choices as explained
to voters during the campaign. The President s power to hold a
particular agency accountable for its actions is limited to removing the
politically-appointed agency head. The public, however, has virtually no
means to hold the agency accountable, although the public is the primary
recipient of the agency s actions whether favorable or unfavorable.
Similarly, shareholders elect directors to make business decisions for the
corporation, and those directors in turn appoint officers to run the daily
business of the corporation. The directors have the ability to remove
these officers from their positions as well as the legal authority to
approve certain actions. The shareholders, however, cannot hold these
officers accountable, although the shareholders indirectly can do so by
not re-electing the directors at the next annual meeting.
B. Accountability Through Formal, Legal Methods
As demonstrated in the prior section, informal methods produce
weak accountability. Accountability, however, can also be created
through formal mechanisms those that are derived from a legal source
(superimposed fixed rules, regulations or procedures that restrict
authority or mandate information disclosure). 69 Formal accountability
66.
67.
68.
69.

Bressman, supra note 63, at 486 91 (discussing the presidential control model).
Id. at 506.
Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 684.
Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261.

08.0_SCARLETT FINAL

52

10/25/2008 11:49:21 AM

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

typically occurs through an evaluation conducted by external means,
such as judicial and quasi-judicial processes,70 and for that reason many
examples of formal accountability can be found in the law. Although
administrative law presents a more complicated authority versus
accountability dilemma than the modern corporation, others, such as
disputes involving prisoners and hospital staffing, offer more
equivalently complicated dilemmas. The following sections briefly
describe the authority versus accountability dilemmas presented in each
of these contexts and explain how those competing interests are balanced
in each context. Each section also evaluates whether that context
presents any insights for shareholder derivative litigation.
1. Administrative Law
As noted above, the administrative agencies possess significant
authority, but are subject to little control because the informal methods of
accountability are largely ineffective. Formal accountability also appears
ineffective in this context because the power of judicial review for
agency actions is limited.71 Under current law s Chevron standard,
courts must defer to reasonable administrative statutory interpretations
that rely upon the incumbent administration s views of wise
policy . . . . 72 Thus, courts largely defer to the agency s policy choice
when the authority versus accountability dilemma of administrative law
is presented through litigation, but they do not always do so.73 Similar to
70. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 3 5 ( [Accountability] can also be created by rules,
monitored by independent organizations and by courts. ); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261
(stating that external accountability usually involves evaluation of performance and outcomes by a
credible external entity (private or public) in the context of predetermined boundaries ).
71. Bressman, supra note 63, at 516 (discussing the proposition that courts give agencies
virtually unlimited discretion to choose their procedures for making general policy (citing S.E.C.
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947))).
72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
73. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 559, 604 07 (2006) (noting that courts have begun to refuse to defer to agency interpretations
of ambiguous agency rules where the rules were written in an extraordinarily open-ended manner,
that courts refuse to defer to an agency interpretation of a rule when that interpretation is announced
only as a litigating position, and that [c]ourts regularly refuse to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous rules in the context of enforcement proceedings in which agencies seek to impose
penalties on firms for violating agency rules without adequate advance notice that such conduct
would violate the rule); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 915 (2001) ( The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that agency interpretations of
statutes that deviate from the Court s own precedents are not entitled to Chevron deference. ); id. at
836 (arguing that instead of applying Chevron, courts may apply the multi-factoral approach to
deference embodied in the Court s venerable decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944), which included such contextual factors as the expertise of the agency, the thoroughness
of the agency s decision, and the agency s consistency with prior interpretations).
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the corporate context, such deference has been justified on the basis that
courts lack expertise in such matters. But administrative law has not
found a balancing point in judicial review of agencies actions that is
much different from the current business judgment rule approach to
reviewing directors actions. For that reason, administrative law offers
no new solutions for shareholder derivative litigation.
2. Prisoner Litigation
An authority versus accountability dilemma similar to that presented
in corporations appears in the context of prisoner litigation. Prisoners
may seek redress of their grievances through litigation, which necessarily
interferes with the prison administration s authority to administer their
prisons and potentially increases the cost of prison administration. Prior
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),74 a prisoner s complaint
could be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief. 75 Such a procedure was criticized as
allowing excessive federal judicial intervention into state prison
administration and increasing expenses for the states.76 In fact, prior to
the PLRA, state prisoner litigation accounted for the single largest
category of civil lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts. 77 Further, these
prisoner lawsuits represented the case type with the lowest plaintiff win
rate as such plaintiffs were successful in only 1.4% of lawsuits filed. 78
The PLRA sought to remedy these problems by mandating that
inmates cannot initiate a lawsuit for violation of federal law unless they
first have exhausted such administrative remedies as are available. 79
Thus, courts may dismiss such actions when inmates have failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. By mandating that inmates first
74. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801 810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
75. Eugene J. Kuzinski, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation,
Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 363 (1998)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 21 (1972)).
76. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 1525 26 (2003).
77. Id. at 1525; see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557
(2003) (stating that in 1995, inmate lawsuits constituted nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket ).
78. Ostrom et al., supra note 76, at 1526.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 485 (2005) (noting that the PLRA was enacted primarily to curtail claims brought
by prisoners under § 1983 and placed strict limits on prisoners access to federal courts (quoting
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996))).
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turn to more immediate and less expensive methods of resolution, there
is a greater chance that simple disputes may be resolved within the prison
itself, without involving the judicial process. 80 The PLRA also directs
courts to dismiss inmate claims, either upon the court s own motion or
that of a party, when the claim is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 81 Additionally, new
pleading standards apply to prisoner lawsuits.82
The PLRA also alters the outcome of a successful prisoner lawsuit.
[T]he PLRA reforms the prospective and preliminary relief that judges
may order, establishes findings upon which such relief must be based,
and sets the permissible length of such relief. 83 These revised
procedures seek to ensure that federal judges will be involved in prison
affairs for only so long and only as necessary to remedy a
constitutional violation. 84 The court may not grant prospective relief
unless it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. 85 In doing so, the
court also must give substantial weight to any adverse impact upon
public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the
relief. 86
The PLRA achieved its purpose, as forty-three percent fewer
inmate-initiated complaints were filed in 2001 than in 1995, despite the
fact that the actual inmate population had increased by twenty-three
percent in the same time period. 87 The PLRA s attempt to lessen
judicial interference with prison administration, however, has received its
fair share of criticism for creating the wrong balance between authority
and accountability.88 Prisoner grievance procedures can be understood
80. Kuzinski, supra note 75, at 381.
81. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).
82. For instance, an inmate cannot file a lawsuit for mental or emotional injury unless they can
also show physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), unconstitutional as applied by Siggers-El v.
Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
83. Kuzinski, supra note 75, at 376.
84. Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000).
86. Id.
87. Geraldine Doetzer, Hard Labor: The Legal Implications of Shackling Female Inmates
During Pregnancy and Childbirth, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 363, 376 (2008) (citing Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, at 1559 60 (2003)).
88. See generally Adam Slutsky, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289 (2005); David M.
Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The Iron Triangle of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2001).

08.0_SCARLETT FINAL

2008]

10/25/2008 11:49:21 AM

A BETTER APPROACH FOR BALANCING AUTHORITY

55

as creating a balance between three competing goals: (1) prison
administrators authority to autonomously operate prisons, (2) the
containment of costs attributable to prison administration, and (3) the
institution of effective procedural conduits for the protection of
prisoners rights . . . . 89 The PLRA has been criticized as overvalu[ing]
autonomy and cost control at the expense of prisoners rights, 90 or in
other words, the PLRA overvalues authority at the expense of
accountability. One critic proposes that increased transparency of
grievance procedures would foster greater accountability at modest cost,
without unduly interfering with the task of prison administration. 91
Prisoner litigation does not appear to offer a close analogy to
corporations.
Prison administrators have absolute authority over
prisoners, and can only be held accountable through litigation. Prisoners
have no other means of holding prison administrators accountable for
their decisions. By contrast, directors do not have absolute power over
corporations. Shareholders must approve certain corporate actions and
shareholders can theoretically hold directors accountable through means
other than litigation. However, the resolution of the authority versus
accountability dilemma in prisoner litigation may present some useful
insights for shareholder derivative litigation. The authority of prison
administrators can be challenged only through litigation, but such
litigation is governed by procedural rules designed to ensure prison
administrators authority is not disturbed except in egregious
circumstances and then only after prison administrators first have had the
opportunity to resolve the problem. Thus, if the balance of authority and
accountability needs to be weighted more toward directors authority in
the context of shareholder derivative litigation, the procedural rules of
the PLRA may offer methods for doing so.
3. Hospital Staff Privileges
Another interesting example of the difficulty of balancing authority
and accountability can be found in the area of hospital-staffing decisions.
At first blush, the balance appears to be heavily tilted toward authority,
because the general rule is that a private hospital may control its staffing
procedures without court interference in such business decisions.92
89. Adlerstein, supra note 88, at 1683.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1697.
92. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From
Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL
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However, an exception exists when the decision involves the revocation,
suspension, or reduction of existing staff privileges in private hospitals
that are quasi-public or constitute a virtual monopoly in a particular
area.93 In such cases, courts must accord great deference to hospitals
decisions regarding staff privileges, and judicial review is limited to
factors which are within the expertise of courts.94 Judicial review,
however, is allowed to determine that the hospital complied with its
bylaws and to ensure the hospital s bylaws afforded staff basic notice
and fair hearing procedures.95 Further, a court may review a private
hospital s actions even where the bylaws have been followed if actual
unfairness on the part of the hospital, its committees, or individual
members of the committees has been demonstrated in the record.96 In
such cases, judicial review of hospital decisions regarding staff
procedures and privileges has included a determination that the decision
was made in good faith and on objectively reasonable grounds, the
decision was consistent with the public interest, and the decision was
supported by sufficient evidence. 97
In sum, the balance in this context appears weighted toward
accountability, despite statements that the courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of hospitals, because courts have held that they can
review staff decisions on such broad notions as good faith,
reasonableness, unfairness, and sufficient evidence.
Litigation
challenging hospitals decisions regarding staff privileges resembles
shareholder derivative litigation challenging directors decisions. In both
circumstances, courts have recognized that such decisions are business
decisions within the defendants discretion and that deference should be
given to the defendants. Further, in both contexts, courts can potentially
exercise broad judicial review, although arguably courts are conducting
more searching review of hospitals decisions when they review
decisions regarding staff privileges for objectively reasonable grounds
consistent with public interest. If a normative judgment is made that
judicial review of directors decisions should be broader than current law
permits, this analogy may offer a way to do so.
L. REV. 1179, 1215 (2006).
93. See Kevin M. McKenna, Courts Leave Legislatures to Decide the Fate of the NCAA in
Providing Due Process, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 77, 113 (1992) (stating an Illinois exception to
the rule of non-review where a hospital must follow its own bylaws when revoking or reducing
staff privileges or be subject to limited judicial review ).
94. See Van Tassel, supra note 92, at 1201.
95. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 32 (2008).
96. Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ill. 1989).
97. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 32 (2008).
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III. BALANCING AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Shareholder derivative litigation constitutes the formal method of
accountability in the corporate context. In that context, the business
judgment rule currently functions as the mechanism that balances
directors authority against shareholders right to hold directors
accountable.
In corporate law, authority and accountability are
competing powers that are in tension, because more of one means less of
the other.98 Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow described the crux
of this authority versus accountability dilemma when he explained that
the power to hold to account is ultimately the power to decide. 99 This
idea has led a corporate scholar to argue that efforts to hold the board
accountable necessarily shift some of the board s decision-making
authority to shareholders or judges. 100 Correspondingly, efforts to
insulate the board from legal liability necessarily increase the board s
authority while decreasing shareholders ability to hold directors
accountable. The question is how best to balance authority and
accountability within the context of shareholder derivative litigation.
Section A explains the current formulation of the business judgment rule
in balancing authority and accountability in such litigation. Section B
then examines proposals to shift the balance toward accountability, while
Section C analyzes proposals to shift the balance toward authority.
A. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is one of the most controversial and least
understood doctrines of corporate law.101 It has received extensive
98. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 86, 108. The tension between authority and accountability
can be seen not only in the director primacy model, but also in the shareholder primacy model of
corporate governance. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 875 (2005) (advocating for more accountability); Jill E. Fisch,
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 662
63 (2006) (discussing fiduciary duties as a method of accountability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441, 444 49 (2001)
(discussing the shareholder primacy model, as well as the manager-oriented model, the labororiented model, and the state-oriented model).
99. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 103, 108 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 78 (1974)).
100. Id. at 103 04.
101. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93
(1979) (stating the business judgment rule is misunderstood); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 83 84
( Countless cases invoke it and countless scholars have analyzed it. Yet, despite all of the attention
lavished on it, the business judgment rule remains poorly understood. ); Douglas M. Branson,
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debate among scholars, practitioners, and judges as to its proper
formulation and application.102 Yet no satisfying framework for
understanding and applying the business judgment rule has developed.103
The business judgment rule has existed in American corporate law
for almost two centuries.104 Developed through common law, it
generally protects directors from liability for their decisions when
challenged by shareholders through derivative litigation. Judges and
scholars have advanced many rationales for the business judgment rule:
preventing shareholders from second-guessing directors decisions with
the benefit of hindsight, 105 protecting directors from liability for honest
mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisions, 106 encouraging
directors to take calculated business risks,107 providing protection to
Lecture, The Rule That Isn t A Rule The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631
(2002) (stating the business judgment rule is much misunderstood ); Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 454 (2005) ( Manne s
statement about the rule remains as true in 2005 as when first made in 1967: the business judgment
rule is one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field. ); Henry G. Manne, Our
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (stating the
business judgment rule is one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field ).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 573 (2000) (noting that thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and commentary
have been devoted to [the business judgment rule], yet we remain short of any broad consensus as to
[its rationale] ); Johnson, supra note 101, at 454 (recognizing that there is deep rooted
disagreement about the basic purpose and thrust of the business judgment rule and the degree of
deference that courts . . . should accord director judgments ); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani,
Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 726
(2007) (stating that confusion of the business judgment rule stems from the issue of whether [the
Rule] is simply a doctrine that prevents courts from second-guessing good faith business decisions or
whether it is a standard of care ); Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning
Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van Gorkom, 62 BUS. LAW. 135, 143 (2006) (stating the
business judgment rule is a misunderstood legal doctrine because of the inability to appreciate the
mechanics of the rule).
103. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 287 88 (1994) (stating that [a]t first glance, the general concept
behind the [business judgment] rule seems unassailable but that a problem occurs when courts and
writers attempt to inject specific content into this general proposition immediately, a lack of
consensus emerges as to what the rule really is ).
104. See Arsht, supra note 101, at 93 (dating the business judgment rule to at least the early
1800s).
105. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01 cmt. d (1994) (stating the business judgment rule protects directors from the risks inherent in
hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions and avoids stifling innovation and venturesome
business activity ).
106. Arsht, supra note 101, at 96; see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 113 14 ( Business
decisions rarely involve black-and-white issues; instead, they typically involve prudential judgments
among a number of plausible alternatives. Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully
made choices among such alternatives may turn out badly. ).
107. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 110 (stating that encouraging risk taking is a justification
for the business judgment rule); Branson, supra note 101, at 632 (stating the business judgment rule
is built upon economic freedom and the encouragement of informed risk taking ); see also Muir &
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ensure that individuals will be willing to serve as directors,108 and
recognizing that directors are better-suited than courts to make business
decisions.109 The real difficulty lies not in understanding why the
business judgment rule exists, but in determining how courts should
apply the protections of the business judgment rule.
Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a
defense asserted in shareholder derivative actions that challenge a
decision made by a corporation s board of directors.110 Procedurally,
defendants have been allowed to assert their business judgment defense
on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at trial.111
To understand how courts decide whether the business judgment defense
should protect the directors decision, one must look to the Delaware
courts, which are the undisputed leaders in the development of corporate
common law now112 and for the foreseeable future.113
In recent years, Delaware courts have consistently articulated that the
business judgment rule operates as a presumption that directors have
Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (arguing that without the business judgment rule, directors would
approve only low-risk projects even when high-risk projects may be better decisions).
108. See Arsht, supra note 101, at 97 ( The business judgment rule grew principally from the
judicial concern that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the law
exacted from them a degree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary knowledge. ); R.
Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar, Elimination or Limitation of Director
Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 9 (1987) ( The general result has been
that many qualified individuals have refused to serve as directors. ); Muir & Schipani, supra note
102, at 726 (arguing that without the business judgment rule, corporations would have problems
attracting qualified members to serve on boards).
109. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ( The judges are not
business experts. ); Branson, supra note 101, at 637 (stating courts are ill-equipped to review
business decisions because they often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises as to
business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends and
are not susceptible to systematic analysis ).
110. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
111. See In re BHC Commc ns, Inc. S holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2001) ( [I]t is a
bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails to
contain allegations of fact that, if true, would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule,
that claim should ordinarily be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). ); Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of
Cal., No. 5915 (1979), 1983 WL 20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (noting that to defeat a
summary judgment motion, plaintiff can allude to facts in the record which are undisputed or which
are disputed but, if true, are sufficient to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule); In re
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding defendants were
entitled to business judgment rule protection after a lengthy trial).
112. See William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the
State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (describing
Delaware s preeminence in corporate law); see also Veasey, supra note 1, at 443 ( Delaware law is
the default repository for the rich and comprehensive common law of fiduciary duty of
directors . . . . ).
113. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 64 (2000).
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acted in accordance with their fiduciary duties in making decisions for
The plaintiff-shareholders may rebut that
the corporation.114
presumption by showing that the defendant-directors violated any one of
their fiduciary duties or by showing that the business judgment rule is
inapplicable because the defendant-directors committed an act of fraud,
illegality, or waste.115 If the plaintiff-shareholders fail to rebut the
presumption, then the business judgment rule protects the defendantdirectors from liability for their decision.116 On the other hand, if the
plaintiff-shareholders show a breach of a fiduciary duty or show fraud,
illegality, or waste, then the presumption of the business judgment rule is
rebutted and the defendant-directors must prove that the challenged
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.117
Even this statement of the current formulation of the business judgment
rule does not present a complete explanation. As this author has argued
elsewhere, the Delaware courts now apply stricter scrutiny to directors
pre-trial assertions of the business judgment rule defense in shareholder
derivative actions, although without explicitly altering the current
formulation of that defense.118
114. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)) ( Our law presumes that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the
directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the
burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction
was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders. ); see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d
910, 917 (Del. 2000) ( Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut the
presumption of the business judgment rule. To meet that burden, the shareholder plaintiff must
effectively provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged
decision, breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or due care.
Substantively, if the shareholder plaintiff fails to meet that evidentiary burden, the business
judgment rule attaches and operates to protect the individual director-defendants from personal
liability for making the board decision at issue. ). But see R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1345 (1993) (arguing the business
judgment rule is not a presumption in the strict evidentiary sense of the term ).
115. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 73 75 (analyzing an allegation of waste separately from
the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties); see also Paglin v. Saztec Int l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184,
1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting [t]he business judgment rule does not apply when the act
complained of is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent ); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968) ( The directors are chosen to pass upon [questions of policy and business
management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final.
(quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928))); Kamin v. Am. Express
Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting courts will not substitute their
judgment for that of directors absent fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance ).
116. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
117. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 91 (Del.
2001); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
118. See Scarlett, supra note 3, at 603 09.
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B. Shifting the Balance Toward Accountability
Scholars have made several proposals that would alter shareholder
derivative litigation by shifting the balance more toward accountability.
Perhaps the most dramatic example is Professor Gevurtz s proposal to
abolish the business judgment rule.119 He reviewed the various
formulations that courts have given to the business judgment rule over
time, and concluded that the business judgment rule s various meanings
could be broken into two categories.120 He characterized the first
category as meaningless because it is simply saying that directors will
not be liable for their decisions unless there is a reason for holding them
liable, such as if they breach their duties of care or loyalty.121 He called
the second category misguided because it establishes a special standard
of liability gross negligence for alleged duty of care breaches that
differs from typical tort law.122 Professor Gevurtz concluded that courts
should apply the ordinary negligence standard to review directors
actions,123 because directors should be held to the same rules of
negligence as everyone else. 124 Thus, he advocated for the abolition of
the business judgment rule, because it is a phrase of limited utility and
much potential for mischief. 125 Another scholar has advocated
abolishing the business judgment rule in the tender offer context.126
Taking a slightly different tact, other scholars advocate for broader
judicial review of directors decisions through various expansions of the
fiduciary duties which thereby alter the application of the business
judgment rule. For instance, some scholars assert that directors owe a
fiduciary duty of good faith and that a breach of that duty should

119. Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 287 89 ( This Article therefore concludes that the rule should
be abolished and directors be required to live with the same rules of negligence as everyone else. ).
120. Id. at 290.
121. Id. at 289 91.
122. Id. at 289, 295 303 (identifying the misguided category as including three standards
taken by courts and commentators: (1) the good faith standard, which focuses on directors
subjective motivations ; (2) the gross negligence standard, which entails some worse level of
dereliction than ordinary negligence ; and (3) the process-versus-substance distinction, which
calls for more scrutiny of process and limits, but does not eliminate judicial scrutiny of the
decision s merits).
123. Id. at 336 37.
124. Id. at 289.
125. Id. at 336 37 (advocating for abolishing the business judgment rule and holding directors to
the typical negligence standards); id. at 337 (stating that the business judgment rule is a rule
which corporate law would well do without ).
126. Matthew Taylor, Tender Offers and the Business Judgment Rule, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
171, 190 (1998) (proposing that the business judgment rule be abolished in the tender offer context).
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overcome the business judgment rule presumption.127 Because of the
nature of good faith, courts reviewing allegations that directors breached
that duty must necessarily look into the subjective intentions of
directors.128 Correspondingly, courts likely cannot decide whether
directors have breached a duty of good faith on a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, because such a decision necessarily
entails a review of the facts. The Delaware Supreme Court recently has
suggested that directors may owe at least a limited duty of good faith and
that directors acts of bad faith may rebut the business judgment rule
presumption in some circumstances.129
Some scholars similarly advocate for broader judicial review by
proposing an expansion of the duty of loyalty. Under current common
law, directors must be disinterested and independent in voting on
transactions.130 However, courts have traditionally accepted only
familial relationships as destroying a director s independence,131 holding
that [a]llegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside business
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
about a director s independence. 132 For example, allegations that
127. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 483 84
(2004).
128. Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 297.
129. Compare In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 63 (Del. 2006)
( Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their
fiduciary [duties] or acted in bad faith. ), with Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 70 (Del. 2006) ( a
showing of bad faith conduct . . . is essential to establish director oversight liability ); see Scarlett,
supra note 3, at 619 22 (discussing In re Walt Disney and Stone v. Ritter).
130. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993); see also Schoon v.
Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 207 (Del. 2008) ( The requirement of director independence [inheres] in the
conception and rationale of the business judgment rule. . . . Independence means that a director s
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous
considerations or influences. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000))); Orman v. Cullman, 794
A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the
directors either were interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the independence to
consider objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its
shareholders ).
131. See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) (noting that while a
director may be controlled in multiple ways, independence focuses on familial or close personal
relationships).
132. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v.
Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980 81 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding allegation that a director was controlled by
another director because of their 15-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt as to independence); Benerofe v. Cha, No. 14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3
(Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1998) (finding conclusory allegations of long-standing friendship is not enough to
raise a reasonable doubt that a director could exercise his independent business judgment); In re
Grace Energy Corp. S holders Litig., No. 12,464, 1992 WL 145001, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 26, 1992)
( [T]he Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that conclusory allegations of such personal
affinity alone are not sufficient to establish director interest. Actual financial interest must be
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Martha Stewart and other directors moved in the same social circles,
attended the same weddings, developed business relationships before
joining the board, and described each other as friends, even when
coupled with Stewart s 94% voting power, [were] insufficient, without
more, to rebut the presumption of independence. 133 Similarly, alleging
that a director is controlled or dominated by another director almost
never succeeds in court.134 Criticizing such reasoning, some scholars
argue that courts should apply a broader notion of independence when
reviewing alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty.135 Similar to the duty
of good faith, however, such expansion of the duty of loyalty would
likely require a more fact-intensive review of the subjective relationships
between directors.
Finally, others advocate for changes to judicial review of alleged
violations of the duty of care. For instance, some endorse courts
substantive review of directors decisions.136 Although courts frequently
state that they review only the process and procedures used by directors
in making a decision,137 some court opinions arguably permit review of
the substance of directors decisions. For instance, some opinions state
that courts may review directors decisions for rationality or
irrationality. 138 A due care analysis that allows a merit-based review
shown. ).
133. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051 (analyzing the directors independence and the business judgment
rule s applicability in the context of deciding whether demand was excused).
134. See Branson, supra note 101, at 642 ( A plaintiff making [a dominated director case] faces
an uphill battle. Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise reputable business person is not his or
her own person. ); see also Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052 ( To create a reasonable doubt about an outside
director s independence, a plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because of
the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the interested director s stock
ownership or voting power, the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her
reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director. ).
135. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors
Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2005); Julian Velasco, Structural
Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821 (2004).
136. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605
(2007); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L.
REV. 945 (1990).
137. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 64 (Del. 2000) (holding the business judgment
rule requires process due care ); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 88 (Del. 1985)
(reviewing the process by which the directors made their decision), superseded by statute as stated
in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp.,
No. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) ( Courts give deference to
directors decisions reached by a proper process, and do not apply an objective reasonableness test in
such a case to examine the wisdom of the decision itself. (quoting Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695
A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997))).
138. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006); see also
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ( Irrationality is the outer limit of the business
judgment rule. ); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 n.9 (Del.
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presents an obvious opportunity for shareholders and courts to secondguess directors decisions with the benefit of hindsight bias. Further,
allowing a substantive review of directors decisions almost guarantees
that courts will find a factual question as to whether the duty of care was
breached, which will prevent dismissal or summary judgment. Some
scholars urge a slightly different alteration of the duty of care, advocating
for courts to review alleged breaches of the duty of care under the typical
ordinary negligence standard rather than the gross negligence
standard used by some courts.139 Lowering the standard to ordinary
negligence would likely make it easier for shareholders to overcome the
business judgment rule presumption, as the gross negligence standard
implies a greater degree of negligence is required to overcome that
presumption.
Professor Gevurtz s 1994 proposal to abolish the business judgment
rule has gone nowhere. And although proposals to broaden judicial
review through expansion of the fiduciary duties abound, they have yet
to gain any traction in the courts or legislatures. These proposals,
however, signal that more, not less, accountability is sought by many
scholars and perhaps by shareholders.
C. Shifting the Balance Toward Authority
By contrast, the balance between authority and accountability could
be weighted toward authority. The most extreme example would likely
be a proposal to eliminate shareholder derivative litigation altogether.
Because shareholders have other methods of holding directors
accountable, such as the informal accountability mechanisms discussed
in Part II.A., one could argue that eliminating (or even lessening) the
accountability available through shareholder derivative litigation does
not harm shareholders overall. No scholar, however, has advocated
completely eliminating shareholder derivative litigation, although some

Ch. 1986) ( [A] decision by disinterested directors following a deliberative process may still be the
basis for liability if such decision cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose, . . . or is
egregious. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) and Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 2004))).
139. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 289 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) as representative, because the court stated that the directors may be held liable for
breaching their duty of care if the plaintiff shows that the directors were grossly negligent in
failing to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to them); Philip C.
Sorensen, Discretion and Its Limits An Analytical Framework for Understanding and Applying the
Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (and Others), 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 553 (1988).
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have advocated that such disputes could be resolved through quasijudicial means such as arbitration rather than through the courts.140
Giving directors complete control and then making it impossible to
sanction them seems dangerous. After all, as the old adage says,
absolute power corrupts absolutely.141 Even a corporate scholar
advocating that the balance should be shifted more toward authority
recognizes that unaccountable authority is likely to make unnecessary
errors
and that
unaccountable authority may be exercised
opportunistically. 142 That opportunism includes not only intentional
self-dealing, but also forms of shirking such as negligence,
oversight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes. 143 Thus, litigation still
presents an important accountability mechanism for shareholders.
Yet the current formulation of the business judgment rule has been
criticized for treating the business judgment rule as a substantive
doctrine, expressing the scope of director liability, and permitting courts
some room to examine the substantive merits of the board s decision. 144
Because the current approach permits the business judgment rule to be
rebutted if the plaintiff can show a breach of the duty of due care, one
critic argues it puts the cart before the horse, because [d]irectors who
violate their duty of care do not get the protections of the business
judgment rule. 145 Some critics also argue that the current business
judgment rule approach merely assigns to the plaintiff the burden of
establishing a prima facie case the same burden the plaintiff bears in all
civil litigation. 146 In other words, the current approach makes the rule
140. See Andrew J. Sockol, Comment, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory Arbitration of
Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1095, 1108 (2003);
see also Scott R. Haiber, The Economics of Arbitrating Shareholder Derivative Actions, 4 DEPAUL
BUS. L.J. 85, 85 (1991).
141. Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887),
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
142. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 107.
143. Id. at 108.
144. Id. at 87; see also id. at 102 (arguing that the current approach expands the scope of judicial
review by encouraging judges to evaluate not only the directors decision-making process but also
the substance of the directors decision ).
145. Id. at 94 95. In other words, the whole point of the business judgment rule is to prevent
courts from even asking the question: did the board breach its duty of care? Id. at 95; see also id. at
100 ( One does not rebut the business judgment rule by showing a breach of the duty of care; if the
business judgment rule applies, the court will not review the directors conduct to see if that duty
was violated. ).
146. Id. at 100; see also Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 292 ( This presumption entails nothing
more than saying that the plaintiff who challenges a decision of the board has the burden of proving
that the directors breached one of their duties. Yet, the proposition that the plaintiff, in any context,
has the burden of proving his or her prima facie case is a rule with which every first-year law student
should be familiar. ).
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nothing more than a restatement of the principle that a defendant is
entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to prove his prima
facie case.147 One scholar hypothesizes that the current approach allows
more shareholder derivative actions to overcome motions to dismiss,148
and thus the number of such actions that are initiated will increase as will
the potential settlement value of those actions.149 Despite these
criticisms, the Delaware Supreme Court has reaffirmed the current
formulation of the business judgment rule.150
Professor Bainbridge has recently advocated for shifting the balance
more toward authority, by proposing that courts view the business
judgment rule as a doctrine of abstention.151 This proposal has gained
momentum as other corporate scholars have endorsed the proposed
abstention approach to the business judgment rule,152 and others have
urged a similar non-review approach.153 However, no one has critically
147. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 101 ( If the plaintiff fails to carry that burden, the business
judgment rule requires the court to dismiss the lawsuit without inquiry into the merits of the
decision. ).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 73 75 (Del. 2006);
In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 363 (Del. Ch. 2008); Underbrink v. Warrior
Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008).
151. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87.
152. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule:
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 401 (2007)
(adopting the abstention theory and noting that in practice the business judgment rule carves out a
large swath of director conduct which is unreviewable by the judicial system, unless plaintiffs can
demonstrate a conflict of interest or that the board s conduct is so irrational that it could not have
been motivated by a legitimate business purpose ); Steven E. Seward, A World of Evergreen Fees?
In re Pan American Hospital and Evergreen Retainers in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 60 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 399, 401 (2006) (stating the business judgment rule is a doctrine of abstention, preventing
courts from inquiring into the wisdom of a board s decision-making, provided the board complies
with basic procedural requirements); Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and
Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 830 33 (2007) (advocating that the business
judgment rule be aggressively conceived as a doctrine of abstention and application of the rule be
limited to cases where disclosure of the decision-making process involved in the challenged
business decision would require disclosure of prospective business plans ); id. at 832 (stating the
abstention doctrine is [t]he most compelling explanation of how the Rule ought to be
conceptualized as it protects corporations from suits challenging substantive decisions that are
within the scope of board control); see also Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director s Good Faith, 55
BUFF. L. REV. 457, 534 (2007) (referring to a presumption of judicial abstention from substantive
review of directors decisions); Fred W. Triem, Judicial Schizophrenia In Corporate Law:
Confusing the Standard of Care with the Business Judgment Rule, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 23, 27 (2007)
(stating the business judgment rule supplies judicial restraint and abstention and furnishes a
deferential standard of review by which courts will abstain from second guessing the directors
business decisions ).
153. See Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (arguing the business judgment rule should be a
standard of non-review); Sharfman, supra note 102, at 145 (arguing the business judgment rule is
not a standard of liability, but rather a standard of non-review).
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analyzed Professor Bainbridge s proposal nor examined its actual
application in shareholder derivative litigation. Following Section 1 s
explanation of the proposed abstention approach to the business
judgment rule, Section 2 will remedy that deficit.
1. An Abstention Approach to the Business Judgment Rule
As framed by Professor Bainbridge, the [business judgment] rule is
better understood as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in
fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions
for review are satisfied. 154 The key underlying assumption for Professor
Bainbridge s proposal is that the courts current approach to the business
judgment rule inadequately respects the value of directors authority
meaning directors decision-making power.155
According to Professor Bainbridge, corporate decision-making
efficiency can be ensured only by preventing the board s decisionmaking authority from being trumped by courts under the guise of
judicial review. 156 In his opinion, courts must not lightly interfere with
management or the board s decision-making authority in the name of
accountability. 157 He claims that such abstention would protect
directors from the risk of hindsight review of their decisions and avoid
the risk of stifling risk-taking.158 He also justifies his abstention
approach by claiming that judges are not business experts, 159 and that
judicial review can interfere with the internal team governance
structures that govern board behavior by destroying key interpersonal
relationships vital to the board s decision-making.160
Professor Bainbridge argues the business judgment rule should be
viewed as a doctrine of abstention establishing a presumption against
judicial review of duty of care claims.161 Under his approach, courts will
154. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87; see also id. at 129 ( [E]xcept to verify that the relevant
preconditions for review are not met, courts should simply abstain from reviewing operational
decisions. ).
155. Id. at 85.
156. Id. This viewpoint arises from Professor Bainbridge s director primacy theory, which
posits that the board of directors is not an agent of the shareholders but rather, the board is the
embodiment of the corporate principal, serving as the nexus of the various contracts making up the
corporation. Id. at 85 86.
157. Id. at 109.
158. Id. at 110 (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. D (1994)).
159. See id. at 117 19 (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)).
160. Id. at 124 26.
161. Id. at 109.
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begin with a presumption against review and evaluate the decisionmaking process instead of the quality of the decision.162 Thus, courts
following this abstention approach will abstain from reviewing the
substantive merits of the directors conduct unless the plaintiff can
satisfy rigorous preconditions for review.163 Professor Bainbridge
contends that if the business judgment rule is framed as a doctrine of
abstention, judicial review will be the exception as opposed to the rule.164
Likewise, he claims that the abstention approach ensures that the null
hypothesis is deference to the board s authority. 165 He believes that his
proposal offers a more objective approach because, when certain
preconditions for review are not satisfied, courts will abstain from
reviewing operational decisions. 166 He states that abstention in
operational decisions is appropriate since most such decisions do not
create any tension between directors and shareholders interests.167
Professor Bainbridge suggests that an abstention approach to the
business judgment rule has a long pedigree in American law. 168 He
cites the 1968 case of Shlensky v. Wrigley,169 as a classic expression of
the business judgment rule as a doctrine of abstention.170 William
Shlensky, a minority shareholder in the corporation that owned the
Chicago Cubs and operated Wrigley Field, brought a shareholder
derivative action alleging the corporation was losing money due to poor
attendance at home games, which he argued was attributable to the
board s decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field and thus not to
schedule night games.171 Shlensky alleged that the directors violated
their duty of care by disregarding the effect their decision had on the
corporation s finances and by making their decision based not on the
corporation s best interests, but rather on their personal view that
baseball was a daytime sport.172 The defendants argued that the court
should not interfere with the directors honest business judgment unless
the plaintiff shows fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest.173 Adopting

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 128.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 129.
See id. at 129 30.
Id. at 97 98.
237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87.
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777 78.
Id. at 778.
Id.
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this approach, the court refrained from evaluating the directors decision
because it found that the decision was one properly before the directors
and the motives alleged by the plaintiff evidenced no fraud, illegality, or
conflict of interest in the decision.174 Professor Bainbridge also points to
several other cases as examples of the abstention approach to the
business judgment rule,175 including the recent Brehm v. Eisner,176 which
he says was not as pure an abstention decision as was Shlensky, but
notes that none of the preconditions set forth by [the Delaware Supreme
Court in Brehm] contemplate substantive review of the merits of the
board s decision. 177
2. The Flaws in an Abstention Approach to the Business Judgment
Rule
Given limited liability and diversification, Professor Bainbridge
believes shareholders would prefer judicial abstention to judicial
review.178 He argues that shareholders will tolerate risk-taking while
directors will be opposed to risk-taking if they face legal liability on top
of economic loss in the event a risky decision turns out badly.179
However, it is not clear that shareholders are willing to accept less
accountability than they currently possess in shareholder derivative
litigation. Post-Enron evidence suggests that shareholders are not.
Shareholder proposals have achieved majority votes on initiatives such
as eliminating staggered boards, separating the CEO position from the
chairman of the board position, and limiting executive pay, all of which
are designed to prevent directors and officers from becoming entrenched
or promoting their own self-interests.180 Shareholder proposals also have
attempted to eliminate poison pills, which make companies more
resistant to takeover bids. 181 In some instances, shareholder proposals
have proven unnecessary because directors and management acceded to

174. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 96 97 (citing Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780).
175. Id. at 98 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) and Kamin v.
Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)).
176. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
177. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 100 (citing Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 & n.66).
178. See id. at 110 16.
179. See id.
180. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT L L.J. 493, 527 28 (2005)
(discussing the 2003 proxy season).
181. Thomas Kostigen, Shareholder Activism Is Turning into Profits for Investors, THOMSON
FINANCIAL NEWS, June 15, 2007.
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the shareholders demands.182 Shareholders also are impacting corporate
decision-making on such issues as environmental standards and labor
rights.183
Even if Professor Bainbridge were correct in his assumptions that
shareholders would prefer judicial abstention and that courts are not
giving sufficient deference to directors decisions under the current
formulation of the business judgment rule, his proposed abstention
approach does not offer the ideal solution. As described in Section a, the
proposed abstention approach will not significantly alter shareholder
derivative lawsuits, because it operates essentially the same in the
context of litigation as the current formulation of the business judgment
rule and otherwise is too limited to be useful as a replacement for the
current formulation. In addition, Section b explains that courts are
unlikely to adopt the proposed abstention doctrine approach to the
business judgment rule, because it does not fit within the abstention
doctrines commonly recognized by courts and abstention otherwise does
not present a desirable approach.
a. An Abstention Approach Operates the Same in Litigation as the
Current Approach to the Business Judgment Rule
The proposed abstention approach to the business judgment rule does
not function differently in practice than the current formulation of the
business judgment rule. The current formulation views the business
judgment rule as a presumption protecting directors decisions, and that
the presumption is rebuttable by plaintiffs in certain ways. Under the
proposed abstention approach, courts begin with a presumption against
review and will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the
directors conduct unless the plaintiff can carry the very heavy burden of
rebutting that presumption. 184 Thus, both the current approach and the
182. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for
Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 260 61 (2007) (noting in 2006
that management at forty-five of forty-six companies that held a vote on shareholder proposals to
eliminate staggered boards supported the change and that evidence showing that forty-four percent
of shareholder proposals were withdrawn before the annual meeting suggested that many were
mooted by management assent); see also Alistair Barr, Settlement Fever Grips Companies as Proxy
Season Looms, THOMSON FINANCIAL NEWS, Mar. 4, 2006 (reporting in 2006 that more companies
were settling with activist shareholders to avoid potentially damaging and embarrassing proxy
contests at annual meetings).
183. Kostigen, supra note 181.
184. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87 (citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968)); see also id. at 90 (stating that the business judgment rule should establish a presumption
against judicial review of duty of care claims, such that a court abstains from reviewing the
substantive merits of the directors conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment
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proposed abstention approach establish a presumption of non-review,
and courts will not review the challenged conduct unless the plaintiff can
rebut that presumption.
In addition, the methods for rebutting the presumption of the
business judgment rule are similar under both the proposed abstention
approach and the current formulation. [T]he abstention conception
contemplates . . . that, if the requisite preconditions are satisfied, there is
no remaining scope for judicial review of the substantive merits of the
board s decision. 185 Those preconditions include that the directors made
a conscious decision, that the directors conduct does not involve fraud
or self-dealing, and that the directors acted in good faith with
disinterested independence.186 Under current law, if the directors did not
make a conscious decision to act or refrain from acting, then there is
nothing to which the business judgment rule may apply because it
applies only to scenarios involving a business judgment.187 Similarly, if
plaintiff presents evidence of fraud or bad faith by the directors, then
current law indicates that the business judgment rule presumption has
been rebutted.188 Also, under the current formulation, plaintiffs may
rebut the business judgment rule presumption by showing a breach of the
duty of loyalty,189 which requires that directors be disinterested in
making decisions for the corporation, or in other words refrain from selfrule s presumption of good faith ).
185. Id. at 99; see also id. at 129 (arguing courts should abstain from reviewing directors
decisions except to verify that the relevant preconditions for review are not met ); id. at 87 (stating
that courts should refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review
are satisfied ).
186. Id. at 99.
187. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (noting the business judgment rule does not apply where directors
have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act ); see also id.
( [A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may . . . be a valid exercise of business judgment and
enjoy the protections of the rule. ); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del.
Ch. 1986) ( The business judgment rule may apply to a deliberate decision not to act . . . . ); Kaplan
v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) ( Application of the rule of necessity depends
upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment authorizing the
transaction under review. ).
188. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (stating that
the business judgment rule presumption can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith ); see also Paglin v. Saztec Int l
Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting the business judgment rule does not apply
when the act complained of is ultra vires, illegal or fraudulent ); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting courts will not substitute their judgment for that
of directors absent fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance ); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ( The directors are chosen to pass upon [questions of policy and business
management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final.
(quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928))).
189. See cases cited supra note 188.
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dealing, and that directors exercise independence in making those
decisions.190 Moreover, both approaches limit courts to reviewing the
decision-making process and not the merits of the decision.191 In sum,
under both the current formulation and the proposed abstention approach,
courts will refrain from reviewing board decisions unless similar
conditions for review are satisfied.192
Furthermore, both approaches operate the same after the court
determines whether the presumption of the business judgment rule has
been rebutted. Under the current approach, if the plaintiff fails to rebut
the presumption, then the business judgment rule protects the directors
from liability and the case ends.193 Similarly, under the proposed
abstention approach, if the court determines that the exacting
preconditions for review have not been satisfied, then the court abstains
from further review.194 On the other hand, if the plaintiff rebuts the
presumption of the business judgment rule under either the current
approach or the proposed abstention approach, the case proceeds.195
The abstention approach leaves open the possibility of intervention
in appropriate circumstances, 196 meaning when the exacting
preconditions for review are satisfied. Professor Bainbridge, however,
believes that judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than
190. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (stating a director must
make decisions independently based on the merits of the transaction and must be disinterested in the
outcome); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business
judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the directors either were interested in the outcome of
the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the transaction was in the
best interest of its company and all of its shareholders ).
191. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 (stating that under his abstention approach, [t]he
court begins with a presumption against review. It then reviews the facts to determine not the
quality of the decision, but rather whether the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing
and the like. ); see also Muir & Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (stating that courts focus on the
duty of care analysis rather than on the substantive decision, and that courts have been reluctant
to second-guess good faith business decisions ).
192. Professor Bainbridge s listing of the preconditions for review does not include the duty of
care. However, he specifically states that he would exempt duty of care cases involving structural
issues from his proposed abstention doctrine. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 129. Professor
Bainbridge also does not mention illegality or waste, so it is unclear how he would treat cases
involving such allegations.
193. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
194. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87.
195. Presumably, at this point, the case continues the same under current law and under the
proposed abstention approach because Professor Bainbridge does not state any different
consequence than the current approach, which requires the directors to prove that the challenged
transaction was fair to the corporation and its shareholders. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 91 (Del. 2001);
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
196. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 127.
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the norm under his proposed abstention approach.197 The current
formulation also establishes a presumption of non-review, but
intervention is possible if the plaintiffs can meet their burden of rebutting
that presumption. Perhaps the abstention approach raises the bar
established by the presumption, but it seems to reflect only a difference
in semantics.198 Indeed, Professor Bainbridge appears to recognize that
the abstention approach does not provide any clearer framework for
applying the business judgment rule:
The question is not whether the directors violated some bright-line
precept, but whether their conduct satisfied some standard for judicial
abstention. The greater flexibility inherent in standards frequently
comes into play in business judgment rule jurisprudence as courts fine
tune the doctrine s application to the facts at bar. Much of that fine
tuning can be explained as an unconscious attempt to strike an
appropriate balance between authority and accountability under specific
factual circumstances. The principal law reform implication of this
analysis thus may be that courts ought to be more explicit both about
the fact that they are balancing competing concerns and about why they
believe the balance struck in a particular case is the appropriate one.199

The proposed abstention approach is simply not that different from the
current approach, and therefore presents courts with no compelling
reason to adopt it.
Finally, the proposed abstention doctrine appears too limited to be
useful as a replacement for the current formulation of the business
judgment rule. Because the abstention approach would not prohibit court
review in cases alleging fraud or breaches of the duties of loyalty or good
faith,200 it is designed to apply only to a small category of business
judgment rule cases those alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of
care. The abstention approach, however, is limited further to apply only
to duty of care cases involving operational issues, such as whether to
install lighting in a baseball park 201 because such decisions do not pose
much of a conflict between the interests of directors and shareholders. 202
197. Id. at 127 28.
198. Cf. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2005) (arguing that good faith functions as a rhetorical
device rather than a substantive standard).
199. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 29.
200. Professor Bainbridge does not include waste or illegality, but presumably the abstention
approach would not prohibit court review of waste or illegality, which are typically treated the same
as fraud by courts and scholars.
201. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 129.
202. Id.
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The proposed abstention approach exempts any duty of care case that
challenges a decision regarding structural issues, such as takeovers or
mergers.203
In addition, a new approach limited to a portion of the duty of care
cases appears unnecessary because directors rarely face legal liability for
violations of the duty of care.204 Under the exculpatory statutes found in
all fifty states, corporations possess the power to enact bylaw provisions
limiting or eliminating director liability for breaches of the duty of
care.205 These statutes mean that directors will not be held financially
liable for breaching their duty of care, and also that directors may obtain
dismissal of lawsuits in which only monetary damages for an alleged
duty of care violation are sought.206 Thus, the duty of care is relevant
only for those cases seeking solely injunctive relief for an alleged duty of
care breach and those corporations that have not adopted exculpatory
provisions, although such corporations may carry insurance that will
effectively eliminate directors financial liability.207 Furthermore, the
number of cases actually finding a violation of the duty of care is
extremely small.208

203. Id.
204. See Muir & Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (stating that courts focus on the duty of care
analysis rather than on the substantive decision, and that courts have been reluctant to second guess
good faith business decisions).
205. See Fairfax, supra note 135, at 412 (citing J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State
Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004))
(noting all fifty states had statutes enabling corporations to limit or eliminate personal liability for
directors for breaches of the duty of care by 2003). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West
2008).
206. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) ( [A]doption of charter
provision . . . bars recovery of monetary damages from directors for a successful shareholder claim
that is based exclusively upon establishing a violation of the duty of care. ); Malpiede v. Townson,
780 A.2d 1075, 1095 96 (Del. 2001) ( [A] Section 102(b)(7) charter provision bars a claim that is
found to state only a due care violation. ).
207. Fairfax, supra note 135, at 414 (noting that [t]he combination of indemnification
provisions and [directors and officers ] insurance essentially eliminates directors financial liability
for breaching their fiduciary obligations ).
208. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.1 2
(1983) (noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty other than
self-interested transactions); see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
750 (Del. Ch. 2005) ( [D]uty of care violations are rarely found. ); Fairfax, supra note 135, at 407
08 ( Over the last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of
legal liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state law. ); Mark J. Loewenstein,
The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 369 (2004) ( Van Gorkom is
famous, of course, because it marked one of the few times that a court found directors liable for
breach of the duty of care. ).
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The proposed abstention approach could potentially be different
from the current formulation of the business judgment rule if it
eliminated director liability for any breach of the duty of care. At times,
Professor Bainbridge appears close to suggesting that courts abstain from
reviewing all claims alleging that directors breached their duty of care
and, in many ways, such a proposal would be the most defensible option.
In the end, though, Professor Bainbridge does not advocate eliminating
liability for all duty of care claims.209 Further, assuming courts are not
providing sufficient deference to directors decisions in business
judgment rule cases, an approach focused solely on the duty of care is
simply too limited to be useful.
b. Courts Are Unlikely to Adopt an Abstention Approach to the
Business Judgment Rule
The proposed doctrine of abstention differs significantly from the
abstention doctrines commonly applied by judges and litigators. Under
the four primary abstention doctrines210 known as Pullman,211
Burford,212 Younger,213 and Colorado River214 abstention, after the major
209. Professor Bainbridge s proposal may exempt duty of care cases involving structural issues
due to a concern about potential conflicts of interest between the board and the shareholders in final
period decisions, such as mergers and sales. To that extent, such an exemption is unnecessary
because such concerns already are encompassed within the duty of loyalty and thus exempt under his
proposed abstention doctrine.
210. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 325 (6th
ed. 2002) ( These various doctrines overlap at times, and the courts have not always distinguished
them clearly. ).
211. The Pullman abstention doctrine allows a federal court to avoid decision of a federal
constitutional question when the case may be disposed of on questions of state law. Id.; R.R.
Comm n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 02 (1941); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra
note 210, § 52, at 326 (stating that the state court decides the state issues, and the federal court
avoids deciding a federal constitutional question prematurely or unnecessarily, since if the state court
should hold the order unauthorized as a matter of state law, there will be no need for the federal
court to pass on the federal [constitutional] question ). The state law must be fairly subject to an
interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional
question. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979) (quoting Harman
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 35 (1965)); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 326 (noting
also that Pullman abstention will not be ordered if the state law is clear on its face, or if its meaning
has already been authoritatively decided by the state courts, or if the constitutional issue would not
be avoided or changed no matter how the [state law] is construed ).
212. The Burford abstention doctrine allows a court to dismiss a case in order to avoid needless
conflict with a state s administration of its own affairs. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at
325, 330; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317 18 (1943); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) ( Where timely and adequate state-court
review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or
orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then
at bar ; or (2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases
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Supreme Court cases recognizing them federal courts may dismiss or
stay actions pending before them in certain circumstances even though
the courts have jurisdiction under the Constitution and federal statute.215
All of these abstention doctrines represent a sorting of the relationship
between state and federal courts, and reflect a complex of
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that
contemplates parallel judicial processes. 216 Thus the purpose of these
abstention doctrines is to preserve the balance between state and federal
sovereignty. 217 The proposed doctrine of abstention for the business
judgment rule does not fit that overarching rationale.218 Applying an
abstention approach to the business judgment rule does not soften the
tensions in the relationship between state and federal courts, or the
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern. ).
213. The Younger abstention doctrine requires federal courts to refrain from hearing
constitutional challenges to state action under circumstances in which federal action is regarded as
an improper intrusion on the right of a state to enforce its laws in its courts. WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 210, § 52A, at 341 42; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 46 (1971) (holding that a
federal court should not enjoin a prior state criminal prosecution except when necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable injury). The Younger abstention doctrine has since been expanded to quasicriminal cases, quasi-judicial proceedings, and to civil proceedings. William A. Calhoun, II,
Comment, Arthur Miller s Death of a Doctrine or Will the Federal Courts Abstain from Abstaining?
The Complex Litigation Recommendations Impact on the Abstention Doctrines, 1995 BYU L. REV.
961, 974 (1995); Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal
Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1121 25 (1998).
214. The Colorado River abstention doctrine avoids duplicate litigation by allowing a federal
court to stay or dismiss an action on the ground that a similar action is pending in state court in
which the controversy between the parties can be resolved. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, §
52, at 325, 338; Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
Although the pendency of a state court action does not prohibit an action regarding the same matter
in federal court, dismissal in such circumstances may be permissible in some exceptional cases.
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818 (listing four factors as relevant in deciding whether exceptional
circumstances exist: (1) assumption by the state court of jurisdiction over any property, (2) any
contention that the federal forum is less convenient to the parties than the state forum, (3) avoidance
of piecemeal litigation, and (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent
forums); see also Moses H. Cone Mem l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)
(adding two additional factors: (1) whether federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits
because the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against
surrender and (2) the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceedings to protect [the litigant s]
rights ).
215. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 325.
216. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).
217. Staver, supra note 213, at 1153; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 327 (stating that
Pullman abstention is necessary to satisfy the principles of federalism); Calhoun, supra note 213, at
971 74 (noting that federalism concerns constituted the Supreme Court s rationale for the Burford
and Younger abstention doctrines).
218. In addition, these recognized state/federal abstention doctrines are criticized on numerous
grounds, including that they impose unnecessary cost, delay and uncertainty, and also that they
represent judicial usurpation of legislative authority. See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our
Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with Us Get
Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 383 87 (2003).
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relationship between separate sovereigns.219 Rather, the tension in such
cases is in the purely private relationship between directors and
shareholders. For this reason, courts are unlikely to adopt an abstention
doctrine approach to the business judgment rule.
A lesser known and lesser cited abstention doctrine, however, is
potentially analogous to the proposed abstention approach to the business
judgment rule: the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.220
The
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine states that courts must not review an
issue that is strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character . . . which
concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them . . . . 221 The rationale behind this
219. Using the rationale of the Colorado River abstention doctrine, some courts have recognized
an international abstention doctrine, which may apply when parallel cases are pending in domestic
and international courts. See, e.g., Turner Entm t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518
(11th Cir. 1994); Andrés Rivero et al., A Comity of Errors: Understanding the International
Abstention Doctrine, 17 FLA. J. INT L L. 405, 409 (2005) (discussing the Second Circuit s
recognition of an international abstention doctrine). The Supreme Court also has recognized a tribal
abstention doctrine, also known as the tribal exhaustion doctrine, which requires a federal court to
abstain from exercising its concurrent jurisdiction until tribal court remedies have been exhausted.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16, n.8 (1987) (stating that for reasons analogous to
principles of abstention, a federal district court must stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a
full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. (quoting Nat l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985))); see also Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of
Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for
Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531 (1996).
220. Scholars also have gleaned a similar academic abstention doctrine, which states that courts
should not interfere in the relationship between a school and its students or faculty when the dispute
is academic in nature. See, e.g., David L. Dagley & Carole A. Veir, Subverting the Academic
Abstention Doctrine in Teacher Evaluation: How School Reform Legislation Defeats Itself, 2002
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 124 (2002) ( [A] court will abstain from interfering with decisions of school
officials and school boards unless the decision represents an abuse of discretion, is irrational, or
violates constitutional or statutory rights. ); Steven G. Olswang, Academic Abstention Stronger than
Ever, Despite Vaksman, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 91 (1997). The Supreme Court has articulated the view
that universities can best perform their missions when they are free from governmental or judicial
interference. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ( When
judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show
great respect for the faculty s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. ). Board of Curators of
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) ( Like the decision of an individual professor as
to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination of whether to dismiss a student for
academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted
to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking. ). It applies to decisions on
such matters as student admissions, grading, dismissals, faculty hiring, and award of tenure.
Terrence Leas, Higher Education, the Courts, and the Doctrine of Academic Abstention, 20 J.L. &
EDUC. 135 (1991).
221. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 34 (1871) (holding that a state court was bound by an
ecclesiastic tribunal s decision regarding whether anti-slavery or pro-slavery supporters in a local
Presbyterian church were entitled to control the church property); see also Serbian E. Orthodox
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form of abstention is that a church is a voluntary organization and the
members that join the church consent to the church s authority to make
determinations about their status as members.222 For the members
consent to be meaningful and for them to have assurance that those with
competence in ecclesiastical matters will resolve ecclesiastical disputes,
courts must abstain from interfering in such matters.223
However, the Supreme Court has not issued a blanket abstention
doctrine for ecclesiastical matters. The Supreme Court has stated that
ecclesiastical tribunals may function independently in determining
disputes within their proper sphere of governance, but when such
tribunals violate personal or property rights, their determinations are
subject to judicial review.224 It also has given courts permission to
conduct a limited review of ecclesiastical decisions for fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness.225
Thus, under the ecclesiastic abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court
has decided that courts should not interfere in the relationship between
the church and its members when the dispute is ecclesiastical in nature.
Analogously, one could argue that courts should not interfere in the
relationship between a corporation s board of directors and its
Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) ( For where resolution of the
disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions
as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them. ).
222. Cf. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 29 ( All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. ).
223. Id.; John S. Brennan, The First Amendment Is Not the 8th Sacrament: Exorcizing the
Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Defense from Legal and Equitable Claims for Sexual Abuse
Based on Negligent Supervision or Hiring of Clergy, 5 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 243,
260 (2002) (stating that where the ecclesiastical decision involves an internal dispute between
parties that have voluntarily subjected themselves to church authority, where the dispute involves a
question of discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, and where the decision does not
result in a violation of morality, property or infringe on personal rights, civil courts must accept them
as binding in their application to the case before them ).
224. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 ( In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate
the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. );
id. at 732 33 (stating that courts would not be bound by an ecclesiastical tribunal s decision that a
man is guilty of murder nor by an ecclesiastical tribunal s resolution of property rights between
church members when the dispute does not depend on a religious question).
225. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) ( In the absence
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise. ); see also
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712 (stating that although Watson had left civil courts no role to play in
reviewing ecclesiastical decisions . . . Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of marginal civil
court review
when such decisions are challenged as products of
fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969))).
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shareholders when the dispute is business in nature. However, in reality
it is not so simple to determine the disputes from which courts should
abstain, and courts have not applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
consistently or easily.226 Thus, the question of when courts should
abstain from resolving disputes between directors and shareholders will
prove no easier to answer in the corporate context than when it is in the
ecclesiastical arena. Indeed, the same problem exists in applying the
current business judgment rule formulation to real-world disputes
between shareholders and directors.
In addition, for all of these recognized abstention doctrines, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that abstention is the extraordinary
exception and not the rule.227
Professor Bainbridge s proposed
abstention doctrine reverses that principal.
Under his proposed
abstention doctrine approach to the business judgment rule, abstention
would be the rule and judicial review would be the extraordinary
exception.228 Moreover, under the proposed abstention approach, the
court must review the decision to see if the plaintiff has met the
preconditions for review, which seems to suggest more judicial review
than occurs in these recognized abstention doctrines. For all these
reasons, courts are unlikely to adopt an abstention approach to the
business judgment rule and the Delaware Supreme Court has arguably
rejected Professor Bainbridge s abstention approach by reaffirming the

226. Brennan, supra note 223, at 268 ( Yet courts faced with such disputes have not acted
consistently in applying the doctrine. To some extent, this is because not enough focus has been
placed on the doctrine s limitations: First, the doctrine should apply only when the litigants are
members of the church who have consented to being governed and bound by church authority on the
issue in question. Second, the doctrine applies to matters that are ecclesiastical in character such as
theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the
members of the church to a moral standard. If ecclesiastical conduct can be reviewed without the
need to review such issues, the court may determine its legal effect in the context of the dispute
before it. Third, the ecclesiastical decision cannot violate the laws of morality and property or
infringe on personal rights. ).
227. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)
( Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. The doctrine of
abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a
controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under
this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state
court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. (quoting County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 89 (1959))). The Supreme Court continues to cite this same
language from Colorado River in more recent opinions. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996); Moses H. Cone Mem l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14
(1983).
228. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 127 28 ( If the business judgment rule is framed as an
abstention doctrine, however, judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than the
rule. ).
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current formulation of the business judgment rule.229 Indeed, Professor
Bainbridge complained as much on his website after the Delaware
Supreme Court issued its Disney opinion.230
Professor Bainbridge s proposed doctrine of abstention may simply
be suggesting that courts give more deference to directors, as opposed
to attempting to draw an analogy to abstention as that term is
understood by litigators and judges.
Alternatively, Professor
Bainbridge s proposal could be read as suggesting courts should possess
less discretion when ruling on assertions of the business judgment
defense. Either way, as explained in the preceding section, the proposed
abstention approach does not present an effective alternative to the
current business judgment rule formulation.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH FOR BALANCING AUTHORITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
None of the existing proposals for the business judgment rule, as
outlined in Part III, have settled the debate as to the proper balancing of
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation. So the
question remains: is there a better approach for balancing authority and
accountability in shareholder derivative litigation? As shown in Part II,
the balancing of authority and accountability occurs throughout the law,
and the appropriate balance point can differ depending on a variety of
factors such as the complexity of the area of law and policy
considerations. Such balancing can occur through procedural or
substantive mechanisms, or some combination of both, in the context of
litigation.
Regardless of one s viewpoint as to the proper balancing of authority
and accountability in the corporate context, a potential for abuse arises
from the procedures surrounding the courts current application of the
business judgment rule. Indeed, those procedures may contribute to the
critics perception that courts are not providing sufficient deference to
directors decisions. Currently, defendants may assert the business
judgment defense in pretrial dispositive motions, such as motions to
229. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 73 75 (Del. 2006).
230. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Disney: Jacobs on the BJR, Business Associations Blog (June 8,
2006), http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/disney_jacobs_on_the_
bjr (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (quoting the Disney opinion s explanation of the current business
judgment rule formulation and stating: Sigh. I inveighed against precisely this formulation in my
article The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine. It s very disappointing to see such a
perceptive and thoughtful jurist as [Delaware Supreme Court Justice] Jacobs perpetuate this
misconception. ).
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dismiss or motions for summary judgment, and at trial,231 but courts are
not required to render a final decision as to the applicability of the
business judgment rule until trial. Only when the court grants a pretrial
dispositive motion asserting the business judgment defense, does it
render a final judgment on the issue.232 For example, if the court rules
that the business judgment rule applies at the motion to dismiss stage, the
court abstains from further review and the case ends without any
discovery being taken and without a trial
On the other hand, when a court denies motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment asserting the business judgment rule
defense, it is not a final resolution of the applicability of that defense as it
can be reasserted and reevaluated at any point up to and including trial.233
This process destroys at least some of the business judgment rule s value,
because it likely allows discovery and perhaps a trial in which the court
may ultimately rule that the directors decision is protected by the
business judgment defense.234 Directors are not receiving the intended
benefit of the business judgment defense when they are forced to go
through discovery and trial before the court makes its final decision that
the directors are entitled to the protection of the business judgment
defense. Similarly, the non-plaintiff shareholders and the corporation
suffer to the extent that corporate resources were devoted to such
fruitless litigation. Importantly, this procedural problem pertains to all
types of business judgment rule cases, not just the duty of care cases that
scholars frequently criticize.
Section A analyzes the benefits of a procedural mechanism versus a
substantive mechanism for balancing authority and accountability in the
corporate context. Having recognized the potential advantages of a
procedural mechanism, Section B then explains that the qualified
immunity doctrine offers a procedural approach for the business
judgment rule that better balances authority and accountability in
shareholder derivative litigation.

231. See cases cited supra note 111.
232. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 46
(1976) (concluding that only final decisions of a district court are appealable, except under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292).
233. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 754, 757 59 (Del. Ch.
2005) (holding defendants were entitled to business judgment rule protection after a lengthy trial,
after having denied motions to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment asserting the business
judgment rule defense).
234. See Scarlett, supra note 3, 603 06.
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A. Procedural Versus Substantive Mechanisms for Balancing Authority
and Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Assuming that shareholders should continue to possess the right to
hold directors accountable for their decisions through shareholder
derivative litigation, at least in certain circumstances, then the question is
how should courts apply the business judgment rule to balance authority
and accountability in such cases. Although the business judgment
defense could be abolished, such a radical proposal has not been adopted
by any court or legislative body. Thus, this Article assumes that the
business judgment rule will continue to be the mechanism that balances
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation, and
proposes a new approach to the business judgment defense that could be
adopted either through courts further development of common law or
through statutory enactments.
Applying the business judgment rule in litigation will never be an
entirely objective endeavor. Although called a rule, the business
judgment rule is universally recognized as a standard.235 That standard
must be applied to the facts of a pending case, and thus applying the
business judgment rule will always involve a subjective component.
Recognizing that the business judgment defense is a standard, not a rule,
a new approach to the business judgment defense requires the
development of a standard that will guide courts in deciding whether the
business judgment defense should apply in a particular case. A standard,
alone, will not eliminate potential errors in the subjective application of
those standards. However, as noted in Part II, a standard combined with
transparency, such as that provided by reasoned court opinions, may
provide enhanced consistency and predictability in the application of the
business judgment defense, which is necessary for that formulation to
function properly over time. Combining these two aspects, standards and
transparency, fit two common accountability mechanisms:
(1) enhanced structure for decision-makers, which limits their authority
and discretion ex ante through guidelines and standards, yielding more
consistent decision-making across cases, and (2) transparency with
respect to the actions of decision-makers and the outcomes of their

235. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 ( [T]he business judgment rule clearly is misnamed; it is
a standard, not a rule. ); Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (noting the business judgment rule has no
mandatory content, involves no substantive do s or don ts for corporate directors or officers,
and entail[s] only slight review of business decisions ).
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decisions, thereby permitting ex post monitoring in light of the
established guidelines, which, in turn, serve as criteria for evaluation.236

Thus, that standard will provide directors with guidance on how to
conduct their activities so as to obtain the protections of the business
judgment rule. It also will help shareholders and their attorneys predict
the likely outcome of potential litigation, which may allow shareholders
to maintain a method of accountability over boards of directors while
preventing frivolous shareholder litigation. Transparency will also
enable higher courts, legislatures, and the public to monitor trial courts
application and enforcement of the standard.
The business judgment standard could be implemented as a
procedural or a substantive mechanism. At times, the business judgment
rule has been seen as substantive and other times procedural.237
Although in theory it does not matter whether the business judgment
defense is expressed as a procedural mechanism or a substantive
mechanism, it does make a practical difference in litigation. It
determines when the decision is made as to whether the business
judgment rule applies to protect the directors from liability. It also
potentially alters who makes the decision as to whether the business
judgment rule applies. In addition, it affects the complexity of the
standard that may guide the decision maker in determining if the
business judgment rule applies. It may even affect the frequency with
which the business judgment rule is deemed to protect directors
decisions.
If the business judgment rule is seen as a procedural mechanism for
balancing authority and accountability, the judge would decide whether
the business judgment rule applies and likely could do so on a pretrial
dispositive motion. Thus, the decision could occur early in the litigation
before discovery occurs.238 If a preliminary decision could be made by a
court to assess the likelihood of the shareholders success on the
merits overcoming the business judgment defense then significant
amounts of time and money could be saved to the benefit of the
corporation, the directors, and all the shareholders. Further, the decision
236. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 260.
237. Compare Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668, 684 (Mich. 1919), with In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del.
2006); and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), decision modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
238. Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating mere allegations of
director impropriety do not entitle a plaintiff to discovery).
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could be based on a defined standard with little judicial discretion, and
thus presumably without a searching review of the board s decision. For
instance, if the court determined that the board made a decision, acted
within its authority, and acted without any conflict of interest, then the
court could defer to the board s authority and review the board s decision
no further. With a procedural mechanism, one would predict that the
balance would tip in favor of authority.
If the business judgment rule is seen as a substantive mechanism for
balancing authority and accountability, then one would predict that the
balance would tip more toward accountability as the decision maker must
evaluate the substance of the decision. With a substantive standard, the
decision could be made by a judge or a jury. Whoever the decision
maker, the decision would occur later in litigation and likely after
discovery because a substantive standard requires the weighing of facts
as developed through discovery. Inevitably, it is a more discretionary
standard, allowing a more searching review of the board s decision. If
the decision is made after discovery, more intrusion into the board s
decision-making process will occur and likely more disruption of the
board s operations will be experienced. Also, it will be more expensive
for directors, the corporation, and ultimately all the shareholders.
Further, a substantive mechanism yields a fact-based decision, which
makes appellate review more complicated and also makes it more
difficult for the public and legislatures to monitor its application and
enforcement. In addition, it is more challenging for directors to regulate
their conduct ex ante to avoid litigation with a substantive standard.
For these reasons, implementing the business judgment rule by
procedural mechanism appears to be the better choice. As seen in Part
II.B.2., the PLRA uses procedural rules to prohibit prison administrators
authority from being disturbed by frequent litigation and to effectively
limit such litigation to truly egregious cases. First, the PLRA requires
plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before initiating a
lawsuit. Second, it requires courts to dismiss claims that are frivolous,
malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Third, it imposes heightened pleading standards. Finally, it limits the
relief that judges may order, establishes the findings upon which relief
must be based, and sets the length of such relief. Some of the PLRA
procedures could be adapted to the business judgment defense, such as
heightened pleading requirements and the limitations on remedies.239 In

239. This author elsewhere has advocated for heightened pleading standards for shareholder
derivative actions. Scarlett, supra note 3, at 637 38.
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fact, the PLRA s exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is
already present in the demand requirement in shareholder derivative
litigation.240
The PLRA, however, does not present an ideal analogy for
shareholder derivative litigation because the authority versus
accountability dilemma in prisoner litigation is quite different from
shareholder litigation. As explained in Part II.B.2., prison administrators
hold absolute authority over prisoners and litigation is the only means by
which prisoners can attempt to hold prison administrators accountable.
By contrast, directors do not possess absolute authority in the corporate
context and litigation is not a shareholder s sole method of
accountability. For this reason, the qualified immunity defense, which
utilizes procedures similar to the PLRA, may present a more useful
analogy for shareholder derivative litigation.
B. The Qualified Immunity Defense
The qualified immunity defense shields government officials from
liability for civil damages in certain circumstances. The original
formulation of the qualified immunity defense depended on both
objective and subjective factors: what the official reasonably knew at the
time of his action; whether the official had a good faith belief that he was
acting in accordance with constitutional requirements; and whether the
official intended to do other injury to the [plaintiff]. 241 This
formulation sought to balance the interests of government officials and
the potential public victims of their conduct.242 But the substantive
portion of the qualified immunity defense often required resolution of
factual disputes surrounding the defendant s intent in taking the allegedly
unconstitutional action.243 Similarly, when the parties contested what
actions the defendant took, then discovery was necessary to resolve the
240. In most states and in federal court, a shareholder must make a demand on the board of
directors before filing a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. Thus, the board may be given an opportunity to rectify a
challenged decision before litigation is commenced, but the demand requirement will be excused if
futile and a board s wrongful rejection of a demand will not prohibit shareholder derivative
litigation. See Scarlett, supra note 3, at 596 97.
241. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 129
(1999); see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 237 (2006)
(noting that the original formulation of the qualified immunity defense included both a subjective
and objective component ).
242. Hassel, supra note 241, at 129.
243. Id. at 130; see also Engle v. Townsley, 49 F.3d 1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995) (describing the
issues of material fact that may prevent summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense).
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qualified immunity issue.244 Thus, it was almost impossible for
defendants to get dismissal on the qualified immunity defense before
trial.245 This delay in the resolution of the lawsuit was perceived to be
unfair to defendants as it embroiled them in potentially meritless and
lengthy litigation. 246
The Supreme Court eventually reformulated the qualified immunity
defense consistent with its original purposes to protect government
officials who acted reasonably from frivolous lawsuits and to provide
damages for plaintiffs when a government official s conduct was
particularly blameworthy. 247 In doing so, the Supreme Court moved
from a primarily substantive test to a more objective test using
procedural mechanisms to preserve the value of the qualified immunity
defense. The Supreme Court was apparently concerned that under the
prior formulation, government officials would be punished unfairly when
conducting their duties in good faith and might not vigorously fulfill
their duties for fear of liability.248 Thus, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,249 the
Supreme Court eliminated the subjective requirement of good faith from
the qualified immunity defense and articulated a new formulation of the
defense. Pursuant to this new formulation, the Supreme Court held that
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. 250 This new formulation
appears to balance competing interests; to punish only the truly guilty,
not just the hapless; to provide a remedy to the worthy plaintiff; to
protect the judicial system from being logjammed with frivolous claims;

244. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 1995).
245. Chen, supra note 241, at 238 ( The Court claimed that the subjective component made it
relatively easy for plaintiffs to defeat qualified immunity claims simply by alleging that the
defendant acted maliciously or with an otherwise improper motive. It speculated that the experience
of lower courts in applying the subject good faith part of the qualified immunity test demonstrated
that this test was incompatible with the desire for early termination because disputes about officials
good faith were often not capable of resolution without a trial. In other words, such claims were
likely to require resolution of material fact disputes. ) (internal footnotes omitted).
246. Hassel, supra note 241, at 130.
247. Id. at 126.
248. Chen, supra note 241 at 236.
249. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
250. Id. at 818; see also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51
VAND. L. REV. 583, 583 (1998) ( Public officials receive qualified immunity from damages liability
for constitutional violations if they reasonably could have believed their actions were constitutional
under clearly established law. ); Hassel, supra note 241, at 130 31.
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and to promote good government. 251 Thus, these new procedures would
permit unsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated. 252
Because the new formulation of the qualified immunity defense is
objective, the Supreme Court stated that it could be determined at the
beginning of the lawsuit before extensive discovery occurs.253 On
summary judgment, before any discovery has occurred, the current
formulation of the qualified immunity defense requires trial courts to
grant immunity where the law was unclear or, even if the law was clear,
where a reasonable officer might have mistaken it. 254
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not
only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly
established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was
not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to
anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to
know that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as
unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery
should not be allowed.255

In other words, qualified immunity is appropriate where the general
legal principal had not been established, where the law changed, where
the legal standard had been stated only in broad and amorphous terms, or
where the conduct at issue was not clearly proscribed. 256 Thus, after
Harlow, this new qualified immunity formulation provided not only
immunity from liability, but also immunity from standing trial.257 In
addition, to guarantee that defendants entitled to qualified immunity were
not trapped in litigation, the Supreme Court subsequently held that
pretrial orders denying qualified immunity were entitled to immediate
appeal.258
The Supreme Court s procedural framework for evaluating the
qualified immunity defense has undoubtedly shifted the balance more
toward authority, and at the expense of accountability according to some

251. Hassel, supra note 241, at 133.
252. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 08 (1978)).
253. Chen, supra note 241, at 238.
254. Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How Conflating
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 67 (1997).
255. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
256. David Rudovsky, How to Handle Unreasonable Force Litigation: Prosecution and Defense
Strategies in Police Misconduct Cases, 590 PRACTISING L. INST./LIT. 259, 274 (1998).
257. Hassel, supra note 241, at 131.
258. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 25 (1985); Chen, supra note 241, at 239 41
(discussing Mitchell v. Forsyth).
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scholars.259 The frequently stated objectives for implementing this new
framework were to allow early resolution of such claims, to enforce
defendants right not to stand trial, and arguably to reduce the number of
such claims. In these respects, the qualified immunity defense can be
seen as similar to the business judgment defense. Both defenses are
intended to protect defendants from liability except in cases of
misconduct. To the extent that the normative judgment is made that the
business judgment defense must be weighted more toward authority or is
intended to grant directors immunity from trial when it applies, then the
procedures developed for qualified immunity defense could help
accomplish those goals. The procedural framework of the qualified
immunity defense could also reduce the number of shareholder
derivative lawsuits that proceed to discovery and trial, and could
potentially lessen the filings of such lawsuits.
Just like the business judgment defense, the qualified immunity
defense is a standard.260 In adopting the current formulation of the
qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court implicitly desired to
avoid federal damages liability for harms that do not clearly reach
constitutional dimensions and thus eschew[ed] liability except when an
official s conduct violates well-established constitutional law. 261
Although the actual standard for the business judgment defense will
differ from the qualified immunity defense since constitutional law is not
the basis of decision in shareholder derivative litigation, limiting the
scope of director liability may reinforce the authority that directors
possess by law to manage the corporation as well as avoid litigation and
director liability for minor or debatable board decisions.
Similar to the qualified immunity defense, the value of the business
judgment defense would be enhanced by an early decision on the
applicability of the defense and by recognition of a right not to stand trial
(to the benefit of directors and the corporation). Arguably, some of the
business judgment defense s value is destroyed when courts permit
discovery or even trial to invade the directors authority. Defendants
259. See infra notes 262 67.
260. Compare Hassel, supra note 241, at 147 (stating that qualified immunity is a standard), with
Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 ( [T]he business judgment rule clearly is misnamed; it is a
standard, not a rule. ), and Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (noting the business judgment rule has
no mandatory content, involves no substantive do s or don ts for corporate directors or
officers, and entail[s] only slight review of business decisions ).
261. Armacost, supra note 250, at 679 80 ( [L]imiting rather than expanding the scope of
liability for constitutional violations by authorizing its use only against clearly and genuinely
threatening conduct may be the best way to reinforce the special place of constitutional rights in
our jurisprudence and maintain the special status of constitutional rights in the public
consciousness. ) (internal footnotes omitted).
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also may immediately appeal an order denying qualified immunity
because again the benefit of such immunity is destroyed if the defendant
must litigate the action. Similarly, the rationale of the business judgment
defense suggests that courts should decide the applicability of the
defense early in litigation.
The qualified immunity defense, however, may not be a perfect
analogy. Although Harlow adopted a primarily objective test, the
subjective intent of the defendant arguably continues to be relevant in
those cases where the defendant s mental state intent, malice, or
motive is an element of the underlying constitutional claim.262 When
the motives of the defendant must be considered in the qualified
immunity analysis, presumably defendants will succeed less often on
summary judgment because an analysis of the defendant s motives
necessarily entails a fact-intensive review.263 For this reason, to the
extent the business judgment defense and its underlying fiduciary duties
are formulated as more objective standards,264 then the procedural
mechanisms will more effectively preserve the defense s value and
purposes. This procedural approach to the business judgment defense
can accommodate proposals to broaden the fiduciary duties of directors,
but subjective standards for those duties could undermine the benefits of
a procedural approach.
The qualified immunity defense and the other potential analogies
discussed in Part II, however, demonstrate that finding a balance between
authority and accountability that satisfies everyone is impossible. For
instance, the new formulation for the qualified immunity defense has
been criticized for provid[ing] several points at which the court s almost
unfettered judgment determines the outcome of the application of the
defense. 265 Further criticism charges:
Judges are being asked, in effect, to do what they think is right with
very little clear cut guidance. While making the decision about what
would be just, judges must dress up their conclusions in the
complicated costume of qualified immunity. Because they appear
clothed in the qualified immunity doctrine, the policy choices being
made about the underlying constitutional rights are hidden.266

262. Rudovsky, supra note 256, at 277 79.
263. Chen, supra note 241, at 262 63 (arguing that the qualified immunity defense should not be
viewed as a pure question of law, and that facts play a critical role in such cases).
264. For an explanation of objective standards for the fiduciary duties, see Scarlett, supra note 3,
at 632 37.
265. Hassel, supra note 241, at 137.
266. Id. at 147.
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Others argue that the new standard results in only plaintiffs bringing
suit against the most egregious flouters of the Constitution hav[ing] any
possibility of surviving a motion for summary judgment. 267 Any
formulation of the business judgment defense as a purely objective
standard enforced through procedural mechanisms will likely generate
some of the same criticisms.
V. CONCLUSION
As the litigation mechanism that balances directors authority and
shareholders right to hold directors accountable, the business judgment
defense serves important purposes that can benefit directors and
shareholders. Indirectly, the defense helps to ensure individuals are
willing to serve as directors and encourages directors to take calculated
business risks. Directly, the defense protects directors from liability for
honest mistakes, for unpopular business decisions, and for decisions that
are seen as poor ones with the benefit of hindsight. Since there is no sign
that courts or legislatures will eliminate shareholder derivative litigation
or abolish the business judgment defense, the question is how to apply
the business judgment defense in shareholder derivative litigation so that
it promotes these important purposes and respects directors authority,
yet permits shareholders to overcome that defense in cases in which
directors have abused their power.
Other areas of law must negotiate similar authority versus
accountability dilemmas and may present potential analogies for
resolving that dilemma in shareholder derivative litigation. For instance,
the qualified immunity defense and the PLRA both utilize procedural
mechanisms to ensure that the balance between authority and
accountability is weighted toward authority. If a normative judgment is
made that the balance in shareholder derivative litigation should continue
to be weighted more toward authority as contemplated by the original
rationales of the business judgment defense, then the analogy presented
by the qualified immunity defense suggests procedural mechanisms that
can be applied to the business judgment defense for that purpose. As the
scholarship addressing the authority versus accountability dilemma in
other areas of law demonstrates, however, even if such an approach
267. Freiman, supra note 254, at 68; cf. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1097, 1130 (2006) ( Among the significant modern doctrinal impediments to litigation, the
development of qualified immunity for government officials accused of violating the civil rights of
private citizens almost certainly deserves pride of place. ).
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strikes a better balance between authority and accountability in the
corporate context, some scholars will likely continue to call for more
accountability because a perfect balance that satisfies all constituencies
in all cases is impossible.

